> Actually, the big problem with the shuttle Centaur (the Centaur-G') involved
> the changing perception of the hazards associated with venting the boiloff
[quoted text clipped - 6 lines]
> was the shuttle Centaur which, due the heightened safety concerns in the
> post-Challenger period, was deemed too risky to fly in the payload bay.
I believe you are referring to how do you vent those propellants safely in
an abort scenario as well, due to payload weight landing issues. My
understanding from having read the Range Safety reports generated in the
wake of the Challenger Disaster is that the entire issue of Shuttle Centaur
was also extensively reviewed as *part* of a major update to the
Webb/McNamara 1963 agreement on use of the Eastern Test Range as it pertains
to Range Safety Officer (RSO) activities and NASA manned space launch
vehicles. There was an extensive amount of work done on the Launch Abort
Safety Panel and much of it pertains to range safety hazards. A big issue
in that regard as I understand it is the important role the Flight Director
and Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) play in identifying the controllablity of
the shuttle. During the first 30 seconds of flight there were questions
about how well the FDO could actually determine three sigma dispersions both
laterally and vertically IIRC. Anyway my point is that the concerns for RSO
action were very real when it came to having a Shuttle Centaur with an RTG
powered deep space probe. It might make an RSO think twice about Arm and
Fire commands if he is worried about blowing a chunk of SRB through one of
those Centaur fuel tanks next to an Irridum clad RTG. Also back then the
External Tank (ET) had Range Safety linear shaped charges (LSCs) which might
add some significant explosion velocities to flying pieces of shrapnel. The
Challenger disaster magnified these potential concerns making them quite
real. For instance beginning with STS 41-C, NASA observed the actual
detonation of the ET during reentry. It was a substantial event and NASA
sought to understand it immediately. They even installed ET cable tray dams
to prevent excessive aeroheating during ascent. Earlier ETs had simply
disentegrated having already vented their gases in the vacuum of space. Up
until STS 51-L, NASA feared that the linear shaped charges of the ET had
autoignited from aeroheating during reentry. This is why NASA sought to
recover the LSCs from the ET after the Challenger disaster. They were
ultimately recoivered floating on the ocean undamaged and undetonated even
though they were briefly exposed to about 4500 degrees F. This discounted
the aeroheating during reentry theory as causing the occasional ET
detonation but AFAIK NASA has not released the cause of those occasional ET
detonations.
> I don't think that there was a strong linkage between NASA junking the
> Centaur-G' and the supposed hazards of RTGs and plutonium. Remember that the
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> NASA still had to complete an extensive environmental impact evaluation
> before the Galileo launch was allowed to proceed.
I don't know how strong the linkage was compared to the points you make.
Maybe together and with other factors like the LH2 bulkhead cracking issue
on the Shuttle Centaur, NASA threw in the towel. I have not seen the actual
decision document canning the Shuttle Centaur along with its rationale if
given.
> You can find more info on this interesting topic in Chapter 36 of my 2002
> book on U.S. manned spaceflight in the 20th century.
What is the name of your book and where is it for sale? It sounds
interesting.

Signature
Daniel
http://www.challengerdisaster.info
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC
rschmitt23 - 26 Nov 2003 19:38 GMT
Snip
> > You can find more info on this interesting topic in Chapter 36 of my 2002
> > book on U.S. manned spaceflight in the 20th century.
[quoted text clipped - 7 lines]
> http://www.challengerdisaster.info
> Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC
The CD-ROM edition (57 chapters, 1438 pages) of my book entitled "U.S.
Manned Spaceflight in the 20th Century: The Successes. The Failures. The
Options." is available at Amazon.com. No paper edition yet. It's based on my
32-year career at McDonnell Douglas (1965-97) during which I participated in
some of our major manned spaceflight programs (Gemini, Apollo Applications,
Skylab, shuttle, DC-X/XA, X-33) as well as a lot of other interesting stuff
(military reentry vehicles, satellite laser hardening, early Galileo,
magnetic and laser fusion energy, Star Wars neutral particle beam research,
joint U.S.-Russian robotic lunar exploration programs).
Later
Ray Schmitt