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Space Forum / Shuttle / November 2003Dumping the Shuttle
Ever since the Columbia disaster occured a cacophony of voices has been calling for the end of the shuttle program. They say its dumb to put wings on a spacecraft and that we need something simpler to put people in space. Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what many are saying the shuttle is far from the accident prone death trap some choose to portray it as. The shuttle is a magnificent system with capabilities that far outweigh any thing else that goes from earth to space. While it makes sense to develop something simpler and cheaper we should also continue to develop and improve the shuttle. It boggles me to think that one or two more shuttles have not already been authorized in order to bring the active orbiter fleet back up to at least five vehicles. We know conclusively what caused the disaster and what should be done in the future to prevent it from happening again. The shuttle should be flying now with new shuttles and improvements to them in the pipeline...there is little to be accomplished by further delays. > Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because > again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what > many are saying the shuttle is far from the accident prone death trap some > choose to portray it as. The shuttle is a magnificent system with > capabilities that far outweigh any thing else that goes from earth to space. I agree. The problems are not technical, they are managerial. From a purely technical perspective, both problems were seen coming, and were solvable. Abandoning the Shuttle for another manned system would reset our empirical knowledge of the vehicle and it's risks back to zero. The technology has not sufficiently changed to warrant such a risky step (as shown by the infamous X-33.) And by managerial problems, I don't just mean the program managers. I mean the imposition of deadlines by 'whomever' - Congress, the administrator, etc. Deadlines should be irrelevant. This may be difficult, but it is a practical argument. Progress can be judged without the need for deadlines. Consider where the STS program would be now if the program was technically-driven instead of deadline-driven. (By technically driven, I mean: don't assume anything except what you have to - run problems down to their most thorough analytical or experimental conclusions.) The two Shuttle disasters would have been avoided, probably with less lost time to the program than was precipitated by the disasters. The Shuttle would have a perfect flight record, and would probably be handling far more defense-based and commercial satellite missions. It would therefore have garnered greater support from the Defense Department as a national security asset that was probably indespensable. How many launches are really needed a year anyway to practically support ISS? Two maybe? > How many launches are really needed a year anyway to practically > support ISS? Two maybe? Probably. But don't forget *assembly* of ISS.  SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >> How many launches are really needed a year anyway to practically >> support ISS? Two maybe? Fly two the cost is nearly the same. With 5 is about one billion per launch. With just two is 2.5 BILLION EACH:( These costs are before the costs added by columbia..... More flying might be safer, workers not getting practice could lead to mistakes A pessimist might opine that the Station is assembled as much as it ever will be. There are emanations from the Beltway that big things are coming out of DC, and none of them are good. > > How many launches are really needed a year anyway to practically > > support ISS? Two maybe? > > Probably. But don't forget *assembly* of ISS. > I agree. The problems are not technical, they are managerial. From a > purely technical perspective, both problems were seen coming, and were [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > mean the imposition of deadlines by 'whomever' - Congress, the > administrator, etc. No, the root cause is neither technical nor managerial. The root cause is a fundamentally flawed program. The shuttle and the uses to which it is being put simply don't make any sense, and pretending that they do has driven NASA into a state of profound dysfunction. Paul I have to agree with this statement. The shuttle was created to keep a space program going, but it was never capable of doing the things for which it was set up. We had a functional space program that was growing and building, using the Apollo-Saturn system. We threw that functional program, a program that proved that it worked well, and changed the mission to accomplishing rather mediocre goals. The shuttle has been used as an outpost in orbit for short-term experiments, and it finally has a place to go, in the form of the ISS. What needs to be done is to keep the shuttle for the completion of the ISS, then go back to a heavy-lift capability ala' the Saturn 1b or a more powerful variation of that, and get into the deeper regions of space that humans will be able to build upon, namely the moon and Mars. As the technology continues to build, we will go other places. a couple of analogies come to mind: 1) A child learns to swim and proves he/she can make it to the other end of the pool with a little coaching. After that, the parent calls the child indoors and tells him/her not to go swimming anywhere but the bathtub, secure inside the house, because the pool is dangerous and bathing suits are expensive. 2) You own a dump truck which is capable of carrying a cargo that can make you a living. Because of the amount of fuel it uses, you junk the truck and replace it with a small sports car, which is just as expensive to purchase, but cheaper on fuel. Problem is, you need to haul gravel in it to make a living. America needs to face up to what it wants to accomplish in space, then commit itself to rebuilding a tested and trustworthy infrastructure on which to grow. The expenses are going to be there, but the potential gains are much more promising than the costs are prohibitive. The shuttle does low-earth orbits well, but at a great expense, and with limited expansive design. Apollo Applications would have simply taken us farther. Much farther. > > Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because > > again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > The two Shuttle disasters would have been avoided, ... > The Shuttle would have a perfect flight record, ... I doubt it - such a result would be unprecedented. No space launch vehicle system, none in the history of the space age, has managed to fly its first 100+ missions without failure. The truth that NASA (management *and* engineering) fails to really acknowledge is that *all space launchers (unavoidably) fail*. The best of them (and STS *is* one of the best of them), fail 2-3% of the time. The most-often flown rocket, the one with the most mature design and the most flight experience, is Korolev's R-7 (flying as Soyuz/Molniya today). R-7 based rockets have now flown 1,683 times, and failed 96 times. On two occasions, once during the mid-1980s and once during the early 1990s, R-7 based rockets scored 133 consecutive successes, but those runs occurred only after a thousand or more launches. Even after so many flights, R-7 failures still occur. The 1,672nd R-7, a Soyuz-U, crashed just after liftoff last year, for example. - Ed Kyle > > > Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because > > > again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > *all space launchers (unavoidably) fail*. The best of them (and STS > *is* one of the best of them), fail 2-3% of the time. Challenger and Columbia were still two very avoidable disasters that were the result of major managerial blunders, much different from an accident caused by hard-to-foresee circumstances and/or extraordinary hardware failures. -- Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com > > > > Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because > > > > again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] > accident caused by hard-to-foresee circumstances and/or extraordinary > hardware failures. Challenger was clearly a management blunder. With Columbia, though, the engineers were to blame. Engineers failed to properly analyze the problem. Engineers failed to tell management that didn't have sufficient modeling tools to understand the problem. After tweaking their model to provide a positive result, engineers gave management the wrong answer. I don't see how failures caused by management/engineering are any different from other failures. For almost every failure, the root cause can be traced back to a human somewhere, whether it be a design flaw, a manufacturing error, a processing step forgotton, an electrical wire insulation nicked, a flawed software uploaded, a rocket launched into a lightning storm, etc. Humans aren't perfect, whether they be technicians, engineers, or managers. - Ed Kyle edkyle99@hotmail.com (ed kyle) wrote in message > Challenger was clearly a management blunder. With Columbia, > though, the engineers were to blame. Engineers failed to > properly analyze the problem. Engineers failed to tell management > that didn't have sufficient modeling tools to understand the > problem. After tweaking their model to provide a positive result, > engineers gave management the wrong answer. In the specific instance of Columbia, you make a strong argument. The analysis using the Crater tool of the foam impact was deeply flawed - far outside of it's accurate limits - and it was determinable at the time that it was. Had proper analysis been done regarding this issue, and regarding the Crater tool as a basis for reliance (as in the CAIB report), I think there is little doubt management would have been appriased of the lack of confidence and would have acted accordingly with photos and/or spacewalks. However, looking at this foam issue throughout the program, particularly the foam bipod separation events pre-dating the Columbia loss (I believe there were three), you could also argue that management should have initiated a more strenuous examination of foam strikes on leading-edge RCC panels. Similar to the infamous nitrogen-gun experiment done post-Columbia, as well as an evaluation of the Crater tool. I think it should have been rather clear that a lost bipod ramp could, at some point, directly strike the leading edge of the wing, and was one of the greater risks being accepted. Of course, foam damage was considered no big deal. This was a belief most managers and engineers shared. If there is any lesson here it is never trust your instincts, only trust the numbers. I guess there is plenty of blame to go around. But you don't get a PhD in engineering by half-assing things. I still think the blame should be placed on deadlines, and as a result an over-accelerated program. > edkyle99@hotmail.com (ed kyle) wrote in message > > [quoted text clipped - 33 lines] > in engineering by half-assing things. I still think the blame should > be placed on deadlines, and as a result an over-accelerated program. Will an attempt be made to trace the origins of the belief within NASA's engineering community that the foam posed no risk to the RCC? There must be some documentation such as memos and records of meetings where the subject was covered, perhaps going back to the early years of the Shuttle program. Understanding how this happened could provide a valuable insight into other engineering issues in the program which may also be based on certain untested assumptions. "Sal Bruno" <mbruno15@cogeco.ca> wrote in message > edkyle99@hotmail.com (ed kyle) wrote in message > > [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] > in engineering by half-assing things. I still think the blame should > be placed on deadlines, and as a result an over-accelerated program. As you say, there is plenty of blame to go around. The actual report shows a pretty long series of mistakes and lost opportunities. Before making your analysis, you might want to take a closer look at the report. http://www.caib.us/news/report/default.html Jon > Challenger and Columbia were still two very avoidable disasters that > were the result of major managerial blunders, much different from an > accident caused by hard-to-foresee circumstances and/or extraordinary > hardware failures. I honestly disagree. Both accidents were results of technical choices made a long time ago, and (!) the always present requirement to preform and reduce costs. There is always a pendelum swinging in economical matters, and sometime it goes to far in one direction (efficiency) (just to end up on to mutch on the other side (overspending)). So blame the woters that want all but the bill. Sincerely Bjørn Ove The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! > > Unfortunately we have had to learn the same lesson twice since 1986 because > > again it was human management failure that doomed Columbia. Despite what [quoted text clipped - 35 lines] > How many launches are really needed a year anyway to practically > support ISS? Two maybe? >The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! Why not? They should choose a system that meets the needs. Nothing less, nothing more. If a capsule design will do the job, why not go with that? Dale >>The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! everything old is new again. Doing the job as safely and cost effective should lead the design specs. Not sexy and impressive. Capsule design has many features that could help it be a fast manned launcher replacement, and the aerospace plane should follow along when the resources are available to make it safe and effective too. Rushing half cocked to a spaceplane could get us another shuttle,we DONT need that! > >The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! > > Why not? They should choose a system that meets the needs. > Nothing less, nothing more. If a capsule design will do the job, > why not go with that? Capsule should be viewed as a temporary solution until man is again capable of designing a winged vehicle capable of bringing back cargo safely to the ground. In the grand scheme of things, let the russians and chinese build capsules, while USA builds the more sophisticated vehicle with the unique capability to bring back cargo to earth. The problem with a generic shuttle built today is that it wouldn't be so different from the current 1970s shuttles because there hasn't been enough research done. There have been plenty of projects such as X-33 which have never lasted long enough to yield usable technologies. What NASA needs to do is draw a list of items that cause problems/high costs for current shuttles. Then, for each problem, start an independant project to find a solution to that problem. By having multiple independant projects, the failure of one project (such as composite fuel tanks) does not prevent other projects from being completed and delivering new usable technologies. Only once you've found solutions to almost all the problems do you start to build a new shuttle. It is only once you've found solutions to most of the current shuttle problems will your new vehicle provide the significant cost savings and added safety. Setting out to build X-33 or OSP or whatever today is very naive. Unless they've found a new heat shield technology that would significantly reduce maintenance (and fragility as per Columbia), any such vehicle would be stuck with the same problem as the current shuttles. (Snip) Go away, "Nurse" Mezei. SignatureHerb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer Columbia Loss FAQ: <http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html> "Nurse Chapel" <chapel@ncc1701.starfleet.org> wrote in message > > Why not? They should choose a system that meets the needs. > > Nothing less, nothing more. If a capsule design will do the job, > > why not go with that? Dale is exactly right. Note also that a capsule approach could very well make it more likely that a full-envelope abort/escape system could be implemented. > Capsule should be viewed as a temporary solution until man is again capable of > designing a winged vehicle capable of bringing back cargo safely to the ground. Support? > In the grand scheme of things, let the russians and chinese build capsules, > while USA builds the more sophisticated vehicle with the unique capability to > bring back cargo to earth. And what is driving this requirement of yours? How much cargo? Would a capsule not fill this requirement at all? Why not? > The problem with a generic shuttle built today is that it wouldn't be so > different from the current 1970s shuttles because there hasn't been enough > research done. There have been plenty of projects such as X-33 which have > never lasted long enough to yield usable technologies. There has been plenty of research done in the X-15 and shuttle projects alone. > What NASA needs to do is draw a list of items that cause problems/high costs > for current shuttles. Do you have any ideas to start out the list? > Setting out to build X-33 or OSP or whatever today is very naive. Unless > they've found a new heat shield technology that would significantly reduce > maintenance (and fragility as per Columbia), any such vehicle would be stuck > with the same problem as the current shuttles. A capsule approach with ablative reentry heating protection is one solution - but you've ruled that our in favor of something "more sophisticated". Sometimes you need to go back to the future. Jon >>>The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! >> [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > bring back cargo to earth. > ... A significant problem hasn't been solved yet. It is cheaper to build 2 and launch the second one (any type of cargo) than it is to build one and bring it back from orbit. Signaturebp Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003 [...] > > In the grand scheme of things, let the russians and chinese build capsules, > > while USA builds the more sophisticated vehicle with the unique capability to [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > launch the second one (any type of cargo) than it is to build one and bring it > back from orbit. That may well be true for many classes of cargo, but there are certainly things whhose value is in *being brought back*. This includes experimental materials that need to be analyzed on the ground to products that will be consumed on the ground (at present, these two catagories almost entirely overlap, but the distinction may remain important). Not much reason to bring back lab equipment that's been obsoleted, but a tidy way of removing it from the ISS envionment is needed. (You can't just push it into the attic -- no attic space left. If you just push it out the door, you don't have a good way of making sure it doesn't bang your roof.) Sure, you can put it in a Progress -- if it will fit. Hey, how about "retiring" MLPMs after x flights, by sending it up on an expendable, having the shuttle rendezvous with it and tow it in, and then de-orbiting it when the junk is full? And when the door is clear, the shuttle puts the brand new (keep those production lines open!) MLPM that rode up in the cargo bay on, and transfers the new lab equipment! (read with smiley at 1/2 throttle) I haven't seen an awful lot of proposals for large item cargo return for post-shuttle, but perhaps we could go with a BDC (Big Dumb Capsule), that holds about as much as an MLPM, does a (semi-)ballistic reentry, and has lotsa chutes for a decently soft landing. What sort of stuff gets returned nowadays that needs gentler g-exposure than the crew? Anthing that can't take 3G's? How much that can't take 7G's? /dps >A significant problem hasn't been solved yet. It is cheaper to build 2 and >launch the second one (any type of cargo) than it is to build one and bring it >back from orbit. It's cheaper to build, more expensive to operate. D. SignatureThe STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to om@io.com, as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. "Joseph S. Powell, III" <jpowell180@charter.net> wrote in message > The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! The answer is building a system that meets all the requirements laid out for it - not making it artificially *look* like - or *not* look like - one thing or another, or having it use or spur into development some new advanced technology just to avoid "going _back_" to something that might end up being the best way to go for the task at hand. Form Follows Function. Jon Hi all > The answer is definately NOT going back to capsules!!!!! And on what exactly to you base this assertion? No sarcasms or jibe intended. Why are capsules not the answer? What makes a space plane or Shuttle II superior or better or inherently safer? It seems a lot more astronauts have died flying shuttles than performing any other activity, and that's even if you count the near-misses like the Soyuz that didn't make orbit and landed in Mongolia and Apollo 13 as 'should have been fatal'. Much as I love the idea of space planes I can't bear the idea of another astronaut dying on board one of them if something better can be built. SignatureFrank Scrooby ---- "Create ships and sails capable of navigating the celestial atmosphere, then you will find men to man them, men not afraid of the vast emptiness of space." - Johannes Kepler, astronomer and mathematician, 1617 > It seems a lot more astronauts have died flying shuttles than > performing any other activity, and that's even if you count the > near-misses like the Soyuz that didn't make orbit and landed in > Mongolia and Apollo 13 as 'should have been fatal'. It *seems* like it because the shuttle has a higher flight rate, and carries a larger crew, than the other spacecraft. In reality, the shuttle's accident rate and fatality rate were similar to Soyuz, and all the earlier capsules combined never tallied enough flights to make a statistically significant comparison to the shuttle. Shuttle: Accident rate: 2/113 Fatality rate: 14/672 Soyuz: Accident rate: 2/89 Fatality rate: 4/211 All others (Vostok, Voskhod, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo): Accident rate: 0/39 (1/40 counting Apollo 1) Fatality rate: 0/82 (3/85 counting Apollo 1) (It is arguable whether Apollo 1 should count. On one hand, the accident did not occur in-flight. On the other, the accident could easily have happened in flight had it *not* occurred on the ground.) SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >> It seems a lot more astronauts have died flying shuttles than >> performing any other activity, and that's even if you count >> the near-misses like the Soyuz that didn't make orbit and >> landed in Mongolia and Apollo 13 as 'should have been fatal'. Well, how about all of the workers on the ground, both in industrial accidents, stress induced problems (e.g., high blood pressure) and the effects of them, etc. > It *seems* like it because the shuttle has a higher flight > rate, and carries a larger crew, than the other spacecraft. In [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] > could easily have happened in flight had it *not* occurred on > the ground.) As you say, this is arguable, but I would count Apollo 1. It was flight hardware. I'd also count Apollo 13 in the list of accidents. Fortunately, it was not a fatal accident although it was a serious accident and easily could have been fatal. For example, suppose the same event occured on Apollo 8. Signaturerk, Just an OldEngineer "In God we trust, all others bring data." -- Framed plaque from the '60s, hanging in the Mission Evaluation Room at Johnson Space Center, downstairs from Mission Control. > > "Frank Scrooby" <X@Xer.com> wrote in > > > >> It seems a lot more astronauts have died flying shuttles than > >> performing any other activity, and that's even if you count > >> the near-misses like the Soyuz that didn't make orbit and > >> landed in Mongolia and Apollo 13 as 'should have been fatal'. If we are going to count near misses let's include: 1. STS-1 Criticality 1 failure of forward RCS strut at lift-off, 2. STS-8 near burn-through of the left (IIRC) SRB nozzle, 3. STS 51-F center SSME engine out at 5m:45s mission elapsed time. One of the remaining two main engines also would have been shut down too if not for the brilliant action of flight controller Jenny Howard who singlehandely saved the crew and the mission according to Shuttle Commander Fullerton. 4. STS 61-C was set to launch with an improperly fueled ET. 5. STS 29 IIRC almost missed the Edwards AFB runway at touchdown due to high crosswinds. 6. STS 93 was a near disaster due to SSME pins coming loose and an electrical short. Those are all just off the top of my head but to eliminate any doubt as to the severity of such issues, The SIAT report called the phenomenon escapes and/or diving catches because many showstoppers were found outside of all normal inspections and protocols. http://www.space.com/news/spaceshuttles/shuttle_report_sidebar_000309.html > Well, how about all of the workers on the ground, both in industrial > accidents, stress induced problems (e.g., high blood pressure) and > the effects of them, etc. ? > > It *seems* like it because the shuttle has a higher flight > > rate, and carries a larger crew, than the other spacecraft. In [quoted text clipped - 22 lines] > As you say, this is arguable, but I would count Apollo 1. It was > flight hardware. I would too. > I'd also count Apollo 13 in the list of accidents. Fortunately, it > was not a fatal accident although it was a serious accident and > easily could have been fatal. For example, suppose the same event > occured on Apollo 8. Redundant systems saved the day on Apollo 13, whether by design does not matter. If you want to go down that road you need to address all similar failures of criticality 2 systems with potentially similar results across the spectrum of manned space vehicles. Good luck finding them all, they were almost normal in the Soviet space program and many were never reported by the crews according to Jim Oberg in "Star Crossed Orbits". We have supposed the Apollo 8 scenario here before. It did not happen thankfully or 1968 would have been an even worse year than it was. SignatureDaniel http://www.challengerdisaster.info Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC >3. STS 51-F center SSME engine out at 5m:45s mission elapsed time. One of >the remaining two main engines also would have been shut down too if not for >the brilliant action of flight controller Jenny Howard who singlehandely >saved the crew and the mission according to Shuttle Commander Fullerton. There is a 1991 post that contains a detailed summary of the events written only days after the July 1985 ATO launch of Challenger. http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=1991May22.170019.1%40vf.jsc.nasa.gov I'm not quite sure if I understand the ramifications. If they had lost the second engine at around 8:15 into the flight, according to the post, "Challenger ... was not capable of a TAL with safe ET disposal.". Surely, if they had lost the second engine, they would just not have worried about safe ET disposal ... I suppose a tank dropping somewhere on the planet wasn't good, but the odds of actually killing anyone with it would probably be quite low. So, while it definitely saved the mission, and reputations, etc., did it really save the crew? (hmm, and if they had done a TAL, would the program had the shake-up it needed to prevent the Challenger accident?) Nick Nick Nick >Redundant systems saved the day on Apollo 13, whether by design does not >matter. No. An *alternate path* saved A13. A set of reactant tanks in another SM bay would have been redundant, a honkin' big battery would have been backup equipment, the LM was an alternate path. The first two terms are tossed about with some abandon, but they are not synonyms. D. SignatureThe STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to om@io.com, as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. > No. An *alternate path* saved A13. A set of reactant tanks in > another SM bay would have been redundant, a honkin' big battery > would have been backup equipment, the LM was an alternate path. > > The first two terms are tossed about with some abandon, but > they are not synonyms. I pretty much agree. And going by memory, they did add an extra tank or tanks to Apollo 14, although I couldn't find a reference to that quickly so that may be incorrect. Also, by memory, they put the tank in a different location. Physical proximity and damage influenced the design of the Shuttle's computer complex, just a random bit of worthless trivia. I don't recall anything about a beefed up battery or extra batteries. This was how the redundancy/alternate path thing was viewed at the time. Here's part of a memorandum, perhaps this is a bit in the gray area, as this memorandum mixes in the terms "redundancy" and "alternate paths." While there is no need for us to file a separate lengthy report, we would like to emphasize certain points. The total Apoll system, both hardware and software, possesses a considerable degree of inherent redundancy and reliability. Successful return to earth after a major system failure was possible because many alternate systems, modified procedures, and non-standard operations were available to the ground and flight crew. Almost all of the special actions and procedures required for a successful recovery had been thought out and developed in the pre-mission period. This says much for the thoroughness of mission planning. ... Memorandum from Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, ASAP, to Dr. T.O. Paine, Administrator, NASA, June 25, 1970, included as an Appendix to the Second Report of the ASAP. Signaturerk, Just an OldEngineer "In God we trust, all others bring data." -- Framed plaque from the '60s, hanging in the Mission Evaluation Room at Johnson Space Center, downstairs from Mission Control. > >Redundant systems saved the day on Apollo 13, whether by design does not > >matter. [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > The first two terms are tossed about with some abandon, but they are > not synonyms. Please define "some abandon". I will. You corrected me with "some abandon" by failing to acknowledge the full context of the sentence with which you find fault;-) I deliberately qualified the term redundant well enough for most people. Clearly you and perhaps others, are not most people. "whether by design does not matter". The point being that a second set of life support, equipment support, communications, and control systems (the LMs) served the needs of the crew well enough to get them back to the immediate vicinity of the earth alive. It is quite clear to me, having read many books on the space program and Apollo in particular that while the Lunar Module was not designed to be a redundant vehicle for the Command and Service Modules, it served that need in the case in question in almost every way possible short of being a reentry vehicle. You will not find "alternate path" in the standard English dictionary. If you want to have a topical discussion on the need for real redundant systems, let's start with the triply redundant hydraulic system of the current Space Shuttle. That system demonstrates in a nutshell NASA's failure to fully appreciate the correct application of true redundancy. Daniel http://www.challengerdisaster.info Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC >You corrected me with "some abandon" >by failing to acknowledge the full context of the sentence with which you >find fault;-) No, your statement was out and out incorrect, regardless of context. > deliberately qualified the term redundant well enough for >most people. No, you used the term in an incorrect fashion. >The point being that a second set of life support, equipment support, >communications, and control systems (the LMs) served the needs of the crew >well enough to get them back to the immediate vicinity of the earth alive. No argument there, but in any arguement the usage of standard terminology helps communication, the reverse hinders. >You will not find "alternate path" in the standard English >dictionary. I won't find any of dozens of terms we toss about here daily in the standard English dictionary. But then, I don't use a standard English dictionary as a reference for a specialized vocabulary. D. SignatureThe STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to om@io.com, as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. <snip> Argument over. A usenet jury is probably already deliberating my demise;-) > >The point being that a second set of life support, equipment support, > >communications, and control systems (the LMs) served the needs of the crew > >well enough to get them back to the immediate vicinity of the earth alive. > > No argument there, but in any arguement the usage of standard > terminology helps communication, the reverse hinders. Good. It is nice to agree on something. > >You will not find "alternate path" in the standard English > >dictionary. > > I won't find any of dozens of terms we toss about here daily in the > standard English dictionary. But then, I don't use a standard English > dictionary as a reference for a specialized vocabulary. Are any of these dozens of terms available online or in a University Library? If yes, where and in what form? It is my desire to learn more so I can write here and avoid your uh, negative remarks. God knows I have memorized quite a few NASA acronyms:-) Frankly I do not like the term "alternate pathway". It sounds more like a politically correct way to describe quaint lifestyles. Perhaps the term used at the time described the Lunar Module best, "lifeboat." Can we agree that the A13 LM served as a spacefaring version of a lifeboat? SignatureDaniel http://www.challengerdisaster.info Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC >Shuttle: >Accident rate: 2/113 [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >Accident rate: 2/89 >Fatality rate: 4/211 One significant difference is that both Soyuz accidents were early in the program, in 1967 and 1971 respectively. After the Soyuz 11 accident the craft went through a redesign and since then, and the new design hasn't had any fatal accidents. While no system has had enough testing to be really considered 'safe', Soyuz has had the longest sequence of launches without fatal accidents. >>Shuttle: >>Accident rate: 2/113 [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > While no system has had enough testing to be really considered 'safe', > Soyuz has had the longest sequence of launches without fatal accidents. Incorrect. Soyuz has had the longest number of *years* without a fatal accident, but this is highly misleading due to Soyuz's low flight rate compared to the shuttle. Soyuz has a streak of 79 safe landings; the space shuttle achieved 87 safe landings between 51L and 107. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >One significant difference is that both Soyuz accidents were early in >the program, in 1967 and 1971 respectively. After the Soyuz 11 accident >the craft went through a redesign and since then, and the new design >hasn't had any fatal accidents. And considering an accident significant only if it kills someone is just a short step from the same mindset that killed Challenger and Columbia. >While no system has had enough testing to be really considered 'safe', >Soyuz has had the longest sequence of launches without fatal accidents. Given the number of redesigns and changes that Soyuz has undergone, that's not really a straightforward claim. (Especially considering that of the current mark, both of it's complete flights to date have had significant problems.) D. SignatureThe STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to om@io.com, as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. Hi all <<previous post snipped>> > Given the number of redesigns and changes that Soyuz has undergone, > that's not really a straightforward claim. (Especially considering > that of the current mark, both of it's complete flights to date have > had significant problems.) It looks like I might need to do a bit of back tracking on my thinking that capsules are safer. Give the recent problems with the Soyuz and other accidents with capsules how close did they come to being fatal? I can never decide is Apollo 13 was a miracle or a marvel of engineering and ingenuinity. Did God reach down (? where does God reach from in space? Catholics? Ministers? Anyone from the Vatican? Help?) and rescue that machine and its three occupants or did a several thousand determined and professional people on the ground combine their skills with those of the three men trapped very far from home in a very damaged spacecraft and somehow make it work long enough to get them back safely. Or is it a combination of the two, a miracle of engineering. I can imagine that a lot of people were praying pretty hard during those couple of tense days, but there were a lot of people who didn't have the time to pray because they were too busy trying to work out how to get three men back home. That aside how close have other 'routine' capsule flights come to being fatal? The two recent problems with Soyuz are both with a newish model, or with a recently modified version of the capsule. Besides for Apollo 13 I don't know of any other Apollo in-flight accidents or near misses (anyone?). There was Apollo 1, and that was flight ready hardware AFAIK. One of the Mercury flights (Glenn I think) had a problem with the retro rocket pack, and Gordo Cooper's Mercury flight had a malfunctions on virtually all the systems before the end of the flight. Of cause information on the Russian problems might be less easy to get one's hands one. Let's look at the problem another way: What kills astronauts (and cosmonauts)? Is it faulty design? Bad maintenance? Or old airframes? Bad Management. For Apollo 1 I have to go with a faulty design. For the first Russian space loss (was it a Soyuz?) it was a faulty design, the re-entry module interior was too small to allow the crew to wear their pressure suits during re-entry. For Challenger, a bad design (who the @#$% thought segmented SRBs were a good idea?) and a bad management decision (launching despite recommendations of the SRB manufacturers). For Columbia, bad design again? I don't know, the whole ice forming on the ET is a bad idea. Apollo 13, if I remember correctly, it was an actual mistake made during assembly of the O2 tank and not picked up by QA. > D. Regards SignatureFrank Scrooby ---- "Create ships and sails capable of navigating the celestial atmosphere, then you will find men to man them, men not afraid of the vast emptiness of space." - Johannes Kepler, astronomer and mathematician, 1617 "Frank Scrooby" <X@Xer.com> wrote:. > <<previous post snipped>> > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > It looks like I might need to do a bit of back tracking on my thinking that > capsules are safer. Not at all. First of all a capsule built today would not be a capsule limited to the technology of the Apollo era or the Soyuz in any of its variants. Sure the Apollo spacecraft had problems but we have learned a lot since then. To compare what the U.S. Aerospace companies can do with today's technology to what they did some 30 years ago misses the mark. Generally in engineering the simpler something is the more reliable it can be made and the more cheaply it can be made. The real comparison should be how safe a new shuttle replacement can be made to a new generation capsule using our very best technology. I suspect that a new capsule can be made better and perhaps cheaper but they are not sexy, therefore they are not very popular. Afterall what would a shuttle pilot do in an automated reentry of a capsule? At least in a Shuttle they get to land it the last few minutes. > Give the recent problems with the Soyuz and other accidents with capsules > how close did they come to being fatal? Whether you are talking Shuttles or capsules, one does not know for sure what the exact sequence will be in many failure scenarios so you don't know if the vehicle and crew will survive or even if there will be a problem. You just get away with those problems some of the time. NASA knew that the SRB O-rings were leaking past the primary O-ring. NASA knew that ET foam was breaking off and hitting the Orbiter. Call it fate or whatever, but never tempt it more than once if you can avoid doing so. > I can never decide is Apollo 13 was a miracle or a marvel of engineering and > ingenuinity. A little bit of both IMO. If it had been Apollo 8 it would have been a disaster that would have changed history. > Did God reach down (? where does God reach from in space? He is everywhere so I think he does not reach at all;-) <snip> > but > there were a lot of people who didn't have the time to pray because they > were too busy trying to work out how to get three men back home. Really who? Unless they were atheists I think they found time to pray and probably curse a little bit too. <snip> > Let's look at the problem another way: > > What kills astronauts (and cosmonauts)? > > Is it faulty design? Bad maintenance? Or old airframes? Bad Management. The questions are not that simple nor are the answers. Basically though and not a lot of people here may agree--lack of money kills them IMO. When you fail to resolve criticality 1 items. When you postpone safety upgrades, failure testing, research and development, etc., for lack of money, you can call it bad management, lack of government commitment, whatever you want. The crews die because a problem was not resolved. In both shuttle losses, the problems were known, they just were not well understood. People will tell you that there is only so much money. I agree; however if there is not enough money to fly shuttles or capsules safely every time then someone at NASA must say we can not fly safely, therefore we will not fly. Unfortunately that would take a lot more courage than is apparently available at NASA's highest levels. > For Apollo 1 I have to go with a faulty design. The faulty designs though were caused by the time pressure to beat the Russians to the moon. That pressure was caused by a calculated political decision made by a President. Is that a management issue? A political issue? > For Challenger, a bad design (who the @#$% thought segmented SRBs were a > good idea?) and a bad management decision (launching despite recommendations > of the SRB manufacturers). The SRBs had to be segmented for transport. Don't be so sure a monolithic SRB would be without its own problems. For instance, How would one pour the propellant in a monolithic SRB? How would you get the mandrels out after pouring? SignatureDaniel http://www.challengerdisaster.info Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC >"Frank Scrooby" <X@Xer.com> wrote:. > [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >A little bit of both IMO. If it had been Apollo 8 it would have been a >disaster that would have changed history. This has probably been beaten to death in sci.space.history and elsewhere, but would it? Granted, you would have the manned landing "before this decade is out", but I find it hard to believe that it wouldn't have happened at all. SignatureRabbit arithmetic - 1 plus 1 equals 10 Remove spam and invalid from address to reply. > >"Frank Scrooby" <X@Xer.com> wrote:. > > [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > "before this decade is out", but I find it hard to believe that it > wouldn't have happened at all. Well it is just my thought and opinion. Who to blame comes to mind? The President? The NASA administrator? You honestly don't believe there would have been another even more powerful witch hunt? Would possible sabotage have entered the picture? Would we have even figured out what happened? SignatureDaniel http://www.challengerdisaster.info Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC > I can never decide is Apollo 13 was a miracle or a marvel of > engineering and ingenuinity. Did God reach down (? where does God [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > to get them back safely. Or is it a combination of the two, a miracle > of engineering. It was a combination. A lot of people worked very hard to bring that crew back, but they were *very* lucky with the timing of the mishap. Had the O2 tank exploded after the LM had already undocked and gotten to the point where it would have had to drop the descent stage to abort back to the CSM, the crew wouldn't have survived because the ascent stage alone would have been insufficient as a lifeboat. Had the explosion happened much earlier after TLI, they wouldn't have been able to stretch the consumables long enough to get back to Earth. > That aside how close have other 'routine' capsule flights come to > being fatal? The two recent problems with Soyuz are both with a newish [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > flight. Of cause information on the Russian problems might be less > easy to get one's hands one. Gemini 8's stuck thruster Apollo 16's SPS gimbal problem (debatable how close that was) ASTP's toxic leak Soyuz landing mishaps are summarized in <http://www.jamesoberg.com/soyuz.html>. Some highlights: Soyuz 5's service module failed to jettison after deorbit, resulting in nose-first entry until the struts burned through and the entry module righted itself Soyuz TM-5 nearly jettisoned its service module *before* deorbit, which would have stranded the crew in orbit > Let's look at the problem another way: > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > design, the re-entry module interior was too small to allow the crew > to wear their pressure suits during re-entry. That was actually Soyuz 11, the second Soyuz fatal accident. The first was Soyuz 1, which had a parachute failure (also a design flaw). > For Challenger, a bad design (who the @#$% thought segmented SRBs were > a good idea?) Nobody thought segmented SRBs were a great idea, but they were the only booster that would fit within OMB's $1G/year development cost cap. > and a bad management decision (launching despite > recommendations of the SRB manufacturers). Close. Actually, the engineers at the SRB manufacturer recommended against launch; their management overruled them. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. [snip] > Gemini 8's stuck thruster > Apollo 16's SPS gimbal problem (debatable how close that was) > ASTP's toxic leak Jorge, what's your judgment on : Apollo 14's LM abort button ? Apollo 15's SPS thrust ON light ? Thanks. >> I can never decide is Apollo 13 was a miracle or a marvel of >> engineering and ingenuinity. Did God reach down (? where does God [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > It was a combination. A lot of people worked very hard to bring that crew > back, but they were *very* lucky with the timing of the mishap. Also lucky, I would say, with the amount of damage the explosion (or whatever) caused. It was just about the maximum amount that could have occured and left enough to get back with. Being able to survive tank explosions that take out all your redundant tanks is not something they had planned for. >Gemini 8's stuck thruster >Apollo 16's SPS gimbal problem (debatable how close that was) >ASTP's toxic leak A14 arguably should be on this shortlist as well. Had Antares not been able to redock... D. SignatureThe STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to om@io.com, as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. >For Challenger, a bad design (who the @#$% thought segmented SRBs were a >good idea?) The people who had been launching them successfully on Titan III for the better part of a decade at the time. > and a bad management decision (launching despite recommendations >of the SRB manufacturers). > >For Columbia, bad design again? No, bad management again. Brian >It seems a lot more astronauts have died flying shuttles than performing any >other activity, That's true, they have. But it is also true that something like two-thirds of all people ever to have flown in space did so on the Shuttle. Statistically, Shuttle is a little (but not a lot) more dangerous than Soyuz. Brian > Hi all > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > that didn't make orbit and landed in Mongolia and Apollo 13 as 'should have > been fatal'. Actually more astronauts (and cosmonauts) have died in training accidents and in plane accidents than they have riding the space shuttle or any other manned spacecraft, for that matter. The shuttle has only had two fatal accidents in more than 20 years and 113 flights. The ONLY reason it has had more deaths than, say Soyuz or Apollo, is simply for the reason that it carries MORE crew on every flight on average, than any of them. > Much as I love the idea of space planes I can't bear the idea of another > astronaut dying on board one of them if something better can be built. What will you say when the next group of astronauts/cosmonauts dies or is seriously injured in a Soyuz spacecraft accident? -Mike One solution not heretofore mentioned is continuous propulsion to and from orbit. No more atmospheric friction heating would occur than a Concorde flight; thus, no heat shielding would be needed for an all-aluminum structure. To accomplish this would require much more efficient rocket engines to be sure, but that's where research comes into play. Atomic engines is a good candidate and is certainly not a new proposal. Back in '53 Forrester was in charge of the new atomic engines but the project was nipped in the bud over problems in heavy shielding and radioactive exhaust. Today, with new technology, these problems can be attacked and put to rest. Developed fully, it can be visualized that a single stage to Mars and back in a fully functional aerodynamic spaceplane is not out of the question. It certainly makes more technological sense to approach space travel from this angle than to build another shuttle or capsule. |
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