 |
 | Home | Contact Us | FAQ | Search & Site Map | Link to Us |
 | Sign In | Join | Other 45 Sites in Network |
| HomeDiscussion GroupsSpace ScienceAstronomyAmateur AstronomySpace FlightSpace StationShuttleSpace HistorySpace PolicySETI SpaceKB.com Contact UsLink To UsSearch & Site Map |
Space Forum / Shuttle / July 2006Alternate Landing Site - why not use Vandenberg?
During the last days of the last shuttle mission, flight controllers indicated that they would call up both Edwards AFB and White Sands AFB (Northrop field, Space Harbor) as alternates for a Tuesday landing if the shuttle didn't land at KSC on Monday. I can understand why it's nice to have a backup for Edwards AFB, but when the shuttle landed at White Sands previously, it made an expensive mess of the shuttle with gypsum dust. So why not make use of Vandenberg AFB instead for the 3rd field? It has plenty of runway length (15,000 ft, same as Kennedy KTTS), and the runway was originally expanded/strengthened for shuttle use anyway. In addition the approach is all over water until just before making the field, so you avoid flying the experimental shuttle over populated areas. The only disadvantages I can think of is that it is "close" to Edwards, so bad weather there could also affect Vandenberg, and it probably doesn't have the handling facilities. Of course it is actually quite far from Edwards and in a different weather pattern. White Sands doesn't have extensive shuttle facilities either, so it wouldn't be hard to duplicate that at VAFB (or at the transatlantic abort sites) So why wouldn't Vandenberg be reasonable to land a shuttle? There must be *some* reason they are maintaining all 15,000 ft when other facilities have had their runway lengths reduced to save money during routine maintenance. > I can understand why it's nice to have a backup for Edwards AFB, but > when the shuttle landed at White Sands previously, it made an expensive > mess of the shuttle with gypsum dust. So why not make use of Vandenberg > AFB instead for the 3rd field? It has plenty of runway length (15,000 > ft, same as Kennedy KTTS), and the runway was originally > expanded/strengthened for shuttle use anyway. No MLS (just MSBLS jr). Most importantly (probably), no lakebed, which is preferred in several system failure scenarios (such as loss of APUs).  SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. > > I can understand why it's nice to have a backup for Edwards AFB, but > > when the shuttle landed at White Sands previously, it made an expensive [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > Most importantly (probably), no lakebed, which is preferred in several > system failure scenarios (such as loss of APUs). Interesting re: the lack of MLS. Was there ever one installed at Vandenberg? I understand that it was only 5 months away from a planned shuttle launch there, and given how long it takes to install/certify an ILS for a runway, I'd imagine it would have been installed prior to 1986. Also, when I was reading about the AORP manual landing gear/air sensor hack for a manless shuttle, I recall reading (in Aviation Week?) that the planned landing scenario would be at Vandenberg to avoid overflying populated areas. Why would an unmanned, completely automated shuttle be able to use the runway if a manned shuttle could not? And why was the shuttle not capable of deploying its landing gear and anything else needed for landing by remote control in the first place? This sounds very short sighted, given all the other automation available. At the very least, if the Pilot and Commander were incapacitated, (etc.) it would be nice to be able to return the entire ship home and its passengers (dead or alive), especially if the specialists were still healthy-although i guess you could tell one person what buttons to press if anyone was not incapacitated. >> > I can understand why it's nice to have a backup for Edwards AFB, >> > but when the shuttle landed at White Sands previously, it made an [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > an ILS for a runway, I'd imagine it would have been installed prior to > 1986. I suspect if it had one, it was cannibalized for other facilities. The answer is probably in Jenkins - he wrote a very good chapter on SLC-6 - but my copy is not handy at the moment. It's not a showstopper - MLS could be added - but that's one reason why it could not have been used on 121. > Also, when I was reading about the AORP manual landing gear/air sensor > hack for a manless shuttle, I recall reading (in Aviation Week?) that > the planned landing scenario would be at Vandenberg to avoid > overflying populated areas. Let's just say, there's been a lot of bad information floating around on this subject. In a remote controlled orbiter landing, White Sands is the sole landing site. Vandenberg won't even be considered until it's upgraded to full MLS. > And why was the shuttle not capable of deploying its landing gear and > anything else needed for landing by remote control in the first place? Because the consequences of an automatic gear deploy at the wrong time would be catastrophic, and because the designers assumed (quite reasonably) that there would always be a crew onboard. > At the very least, if the Pilot and Commander were > incapacitated, (etc.) it would be nice to be able to return the entire > ship home and its passengers (dead or alive), especially if the > specialists were still healthy-although i guess you could tell one > person what buttons to press if anyone was not incapacitated. Exactly. Shuttle flights never carried more than one or two "passengers", and the mission specialists know when to deploy the gear. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. > >> > I can understand why it's nice to have a backup for Edwards AFB, > >> > but when the shuttle landed at White Sands previously, it made an [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > >> Most importantly (probably), no lakebed, which is preferred in > >> several system failure scenarios (such as loss of APUs). Groom Lake would fit that requirement nicely. :-) > > Interesting re: the lack of MLS. Was there ever one installed at > > Vandenberg? I understand that it was only 5 months away from a planned [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > answer is probably in Jenkins - he wrote a very good chapter on SLC-6 - > but my copy is not handy at the moment. Possibly, although there isn't (wasn't) really a whole lot of demand for MLS (cannibalized or not) anywhere. It never really was used much outside of NASA, despite its promised approach enhancements for civil airports. > It's not a showstopper - MLS could be added - but that's one reason why > it could not have been used on 121. > > Also, when I was reading about the AORP manual landing gear/air sensor > > hack for a manless shuttle, I recall reading (in Aviation Week?) that [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > site. Vandenberg won't even be considered until it's upgraded to full > MLS. For an ISS mission, wouldn't that entail bringing the orbiter in low over Mexico or else over populated parts of the SW US? > > And why was the shuttle not capable of deploying its landing gear and > > anything else needed for landing by remote control in the first place? > > Because the consequences of an automatic gear deploy at the wrong time > would be catastrophic, and because the designers assumed (quite > reasonably) that there would always be a crew onboard. I've heard the catastrophic excuse before, and it doesn't make any sense, nor is it consistent. The automatic command of an awful lot of the shuttle at an inopportune time would be catastrophic, yet computers are well trusted to control the SSME guidance, the SRB ignition, much of the early reentry, etc. One bad command and game over. What is so special about the landing gear that a fail safe mechanism can't be done? > > At the very least, if the Pilot and Commander were > > incapacitated, (etc.) it would be nice to be able to return the entire [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Exactly. Shuttle flights never carried more than one or two "passengers", > and the mission specialists know when to deploy the gear. They might know, but only if they are not incapacitated. At any rate it doesn't seem like a big deal for the landing gear deployment to have been available to ground control in the original design. If the crew passes out due to pressurization failure/ low oxygen or unintended high Gs etc. on reentry, just write them off when they touch the runway because no gear or air sensing? And I don't mean to be morbid or suggest that the shuttle should be used as a space hearse, but God forbid there should be some sort of life support failure on the shuttle, it would still be nice to have the ship land safely, at the very least for a proper investigation and proper respect for the families. On a similar note, the STS-1 through 4 had ejection seats installed. If an ejection seat had been used, how would the pilots have exited the shuttle? There isn't a canopy like a fighter. Are the windows conveniently located and were able to be jettisoned quickly? How would they be opened? If a Challenger-like disaster had taken place on one of these flights, could the pilots have survived? >> In a remote controlled orbiter landing, White Sands is the sole landing >> site. Vandenberg won't even be considered until it's upgraded to full >> MLS. > >For an ISS mission, wouldn't that entail bringing the orbiter in low over >Mexico or else over populated parts of the SW US? I'm in West Texas... there's a whole lot of nothin' out here. I'm told New Mexico has even more nothin'. :-) >> Because the consequences of an automatic gear deploy at the wrong time >> would be catastrophic, and because the designers assumed (quite [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] >One bad command and game over. What is so special about the landing gear >that a fail safe mechanism can't be done? Ask the ISS folks about that emergency cable-cutter on the Mobile Transporter... (Jorge, have they figured out what triggered it yet?) >On a similar note, the STS-1 through 4 had ejection seats installed. If an >ejection seat had been used, how would the pilots have exited the shuttle? >There isn't a canopy like a fighter. Blowaway hatches over the seats. >If a >Challenger-like disaster had taken place on one of these flights, could the >pilots have survived? My guess is yes. Brian > Ask the ISS folks about that emergency cable-cutter on the Mobile > Transporter... (Jorge, have they figured out what triggered it yet?) I don't know, but I can check. It certainly is an instructive example of what we're talking about. For those of you who hadn't heard about it, the Mobile Transporter is a "railcar" that rides on a track on the ISS main truss. It gets power and commanding from ISS through a Trailing Umbilical System - basically a pair of giant ribbon cables along the track. One fine day, the Mobile Transporter decided that guillotining one of those TUS cables would be a dandy idea... and keep in mind that the automation in ISS is at least a decade more advanced than anything in the shuttle. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >> > Interesting re: the lack of MLS. Was there ever one installed at >> > Vandenberg? I understand that it was only 5 months away from a [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > outside of NASA, despite its promised approach enhancements for civil > airports. I would imagine it wound up at one of the shuttle TAL sites, then. >> > Also, when I was reading about the AORP manual landing gear/air >> > sensor hack for a manless shuttle, I recall reading (in Aviation [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > For an ISS mission, wouldn't that entail bringing the orbiter in low > over Mexico or else over populated parts of the SW US? It's sparsely populated. The public risk level is almost as good as Vandenberg, and better than Edwards. >> > And why was the shuttle not capable of deploying its landing gear >> > and anything else needed for landing by remote control in the first [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > over. What is so special about the landing gear that a fail safe > mechanism can't be done? What is special about gear deploy is that it *can* be done safely by the crew. The philosophy was to apply automation only where needed, and not to apply it unnecessarily. That means applying it where the crew can't react quickly or accurately enough, and leaving all other matters to the crew. > On a similar note, the STS-1 through 4 had ejection seats installed. > If an ejection seat had been used, how would the pilots have exited > the shuttle? There isn't a canopy like a fighter. The top of the crew cabin itself would have been pyrotechnically jettisoned. > If a Challenger-like disaster had taken place > on one of these flights, could the pilots have survived? Perhaps. The Challenger crew cabin lost all electrical power instantly when the forward fuselage separated from the mid-fuselage (where the fuel cells are). I haven't read enough about the ejection seats to know if they required cabin power. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >> > At the very least, if the Pilot and Commander were >> > incapacitated, (etc.) it would be nice to be able to return the [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > unintended high Gs etc. on reentry, just write them off when they > touch the runway because no gear or air sensing? If the crew passes out due to cabin depressurization, you lose the orbiter anyway because the orbiter's avionics are air-cooled and require a minimum of 8 psi to operate. If the crew passes out due to g-loading, you lose the orbiter anyway because the orbiter is only rated for 3.5 g forward-aft, and 2.5 g up-down, far below the threshold of GLOC. Any g-loading high enough to make the crew pass out will cause the orbiter to break up. Designing the orbiter for automatic return for "incapacitated crew" is a silly idea since most scenarios drastic enough to incapacitate the crew are also drastic enough to incapacitate the orbiter. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. > *From:* "Jorge R. Frank" <jrfrank@ibm-pc.borg> > *Date:* Sat, 22 Jul 2006 18:43:12 -0500 > > Designing the orbiter for automatic return for "incapacitated crew" > is a silly idea since most scenarios drastic enough to incapacitate > the crew are also drastic enough to incapacitate the orbiter. Food poisoning, as in "Airplane"? (Sorry, couldn't resist!) Malcolm B >> *From:* "Jorge R. Frank" <jrfrank@ibm-pc.borg> >> *Date:* Sat, 22 Jul 2006 18:43:12 -0500 [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >> > Food poisoning, as in "Airplane"? (Sorry, couldn't resist!) Or air poisoning. A leak of hydrazine or something into the breathing air. >>> *From:* "Jorge R. Frank" <jrfrank@ibm-pc.borg> >>> *Date:* Sat, 22 Jul 2006 18:43:12 -0500 [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > Or air poisoning. > A leak of hydrazine or something into the breathing air. How would that happen? All the hydrazine (and other assorted nasty toxic) tanks are outside the cabin, in vacuum - a leak in the cabin would have positive pressure due to the air going *out*, so that no hydrazine could leak *in* until the air was gone... at which point you're back to the first scenario: no air, therefore no avionics, therefore dead orbiter, therefore no point in trying to return incapacitated crew. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. > How would that happen? All the hydrazine (and other assorted nasty toxic) > tanks are outside the cabin, in vacuum - a leak in the cabin would have > positive pressure due to the air going *out*, so that no hydrazine could > leak *in* until the air was gone... at which point you're back to the first > scenario: no air, therefore no avionics, therefore dead orbiter, therefore > no point in trying to return incapacitated crew. Hmm, trying to recall if it was an espide of The Cape or real-life where a suit became contaminated with hydrazine and there was concern about it outgassing in the crew-cabin. "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" <mooregr_deleteth1s@greenms.com> wrote in news:j1Twg.3845$bP5.3524@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net: >> How would that happen? All the hydrazine (and other assorted nasty >> toxic) tanks are outside the cabin, in vacuum - a leak in the cabin [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > where a suit became contaminated with hydrazine and there was concern > about it outgassing in the crew-cabin. Real life. STS-98, it was Bob Curbeam's suit, and it was anhydrous ammonia, not hydrazine. They made him use the ammonia brush and bake it off in the sun before returning to the crew cabin. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. I can't think of a reason. SignatureDanny Dot www.mobbinggonemad.org > During the last days of the last shuttle mission, flight controllers > indicated that they would call up both Edwards AFB and White Sands AFB [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] > facilities have had their runway lengths reduced to save money during > routine maintenance. > I can't think of a reason. When you jump into an old thread, you should consider reading all the previous responses before you jump in. There are plenty of reasons discussed later. SignatureHerb "Everything is controlled by a small evil group to which, unfortunately, no one we know belongs." ~Anonymous >> I can't think of a reason. > > When you jump into an old thread, you should consider reading all the > previous responses before you jump in. There are plenty of reasons > discussed later. I did look and I didn't see any real good reason to not use it. Danny Dot www.mobbinggonemad.org > I did look and I didn't see any real good reason to not use it. Then you weren't paying very good attention. > Danny Dot SignatureHerb "Everything is controlled by a small evil group to which, unfortunately, no one we know belongs." ~Anonymous |
Reply to this Message |
 Sign In
 Join
 My Latest Posts My Monitored Threads My Blog My Photo Gallery My Profile My Homepage Start New Thread Enable EMail Alerts Rate this Thread
|
©2008 Advenet LLC Privacy Policy - Terms of Use
This website includes both content owned or controlled by Advenet as well as content owned or controlled by third parties.