Report: NASA caved to schedule, Pressure contributed to Discovery's foam shedding, investigators say
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Jeff Findley - 21 Oct 2005 13:28 GMT Report: NASA caved to schedule, Pressure contributed to Discovery's foam shedding, investigators say http://www.floridatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051021/NEWS02/510210336/1007
I can't say I'm surprised. This just seems to indicate that NASA's "safety culture" hasn't changed as much since the Columbia disaster as some would like to believe.
Jeff
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Bob Haller - 21 Oct 2005 14:00 GMT Rats you beat me to it..... I was about to post it!
Ahh the BIG question? Can NASA EVER be trusted to operate safely?
No doubt the issue was......
IF THE MODIFICATIONS TAKE TOO LONG THEY WILL JUST END THE PROGRAM, and we will all be out of work....
This same situation is about to occur again, with yet another rushed patch.
Thats why Bush and Griffin are going to end the program really soon, siting budget, safety, and the need to move on....
Report: NASA caved to schedule
Pressure contributed to Discovery's foam shedding, investigators say
BY TODD HALVORSON FLORIDA TODAY Missing foam. View from shuttle Discovery shows missing chunk of foam on external tank. CAPE CANAVERAL - NASA let schedule pressure play a role in decisions that led to foam shedding that endangered astronauts on its first post-Columbia flight, investigators found.
In an interim report, the investigators said they found evidence that schedule pressure contributed to a decision to replace only part of a custom-crafted layer of external-tank foam insulation considered a potential debris source.
A one-pound chunk of foam popped off the part that was not replaced, nearly striking Discovery's right wing after a July 26 launch. The Columbia accident was blamed on a 1.67-pound piece of foam that fell from a different area of the tank.
"Programs can avoid this (schedule pressure) problem by adhering to rigorous systems-engineering principles, setting specific requirements, and pressing forward only when those requirements have been met," the investigators said.
The investigator team is the second group to find NASA caved to schedule pressure during its bid to return its shuttle fleet to service.
In August, seven of 26 people who served on an independent oversight group said NASA repeatedly set unrealistic launch dates for its first post-Columbia mission. Engineers picked quick fixes for technical problems rather than better solutions that might have taken longer, they said.
Accident investigators also cited schedule pressure as a contributing cause to the Columbia and Challenger disasters.
The foam loss on Discovery's flight prompted NASA to ground its shuttle fleet until a fix to the problem can be found. A second post-Columbia test flight won't launch before May.
NASA already had spent two years and $205 million to redesign the shuttle's tank. Much of the effort was focused on eliminating a thick wedge of handcrafted foam that caused the Columbia disaster.
The so-called bipod ramp was designed to prevent ice from building up and breaking off the struts that connect the tank with the shuttle orbiter's nose. Heaters replaced the ramp.
Another area of concern was a Protuberance Air Load ramp that runs along the side of the 15-story tank. It ensures smooth airflow around fuel pressurization lines and a cable tray. Some engineers considered the 37-foot ramp a potential source of debris and wanted to replace it.
The first 10 feet of the ramp were removed to make a separate safety modification. That area was covered with a new type of foam applied with a more exacting technique designed to prevent shedding. Ultimately, no foam was lost from the area during Discovery's flight.
NASA managers decided not to replace the remainder of the ramp.
Head investigator Rich Gilbrech said the decision was based on the best information managers had at the time. "So with all things being equal, the fly-as-is foam decision was a good decision based on schedule," he said.
Still, subsequent tests done before the ramp was built up on Discovery's tank showed the new foam and application technique would stem foam loss in flight. NASA also should have held up work until clear quality requirements could be set.
Said Gilbrech: "When you can, you would like to be able to set a crisp requirement and then set out to meet it, and not proceed until you do."
Andrew Lotosky - 21 Oct 2005 15:40 GMT Okay, is this article basically accusing NASA of not redesigning the PAL ramp?
Because basically, I found this whole argument pretty damn flimsy.
-A.L.
Jeff Findley - 21 Oct 2005 15:45 GMT > Okay, is this article basically accusing NASA of not redesigning the > PAL ramp? > > Because basically, I found this whole argument pretty damn flimsy. It's accusing them of not completely removing and re-spraying the PAL ramp with the newer, better application techniques that had been developed to minimize voids in the foam. More, bigger voids increase the chances of foam coming off.
Jeff
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Derek Lyons - 21 Oct 2005 19:20 GMT >Report: NASA caved to schedule, Pressure contributed to Discovery's foam >shedding, investigators say [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >culture" hasn't changed as much since the Columbia disaster as some would >like to believe. Of *course* you aren't surprised. Anything but a knee-jerk bashing of NASA would require actual thought and logic. (And you also have an exaggerated notion of what a 'safety culture' needs to be like.)
Somehow you seem to have forgotten some important facts;
1) The PAL ramp has not in the past caused problems. NASA made the decision to not fiddle with something that works. (And had they fiddled with it and it broke off - you'd be among the first to bitch about it.)
2) NASA, unlike it's critics and fanboys lives in the real world. In the real world you will *always* have some pressure from some source. You will *always* have to make judgements and decisions and tradeoffs.
3) Even in the presence of a strong safety culture - accidents will happen. (Asheville, San Francisco.) Bad judgements will be made. Poor tradeoffs will happen. Murphy will drop by for a visit...
>> Okay, is this article basically accusing NASA of not redesigning the >> PAL ramp? [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] >minimize voids in the foam. More, bigger voids increase the chances of foam >coming off. And typically people are jumping to blame NASA whenever there is the slightest whiff of something to blame them for. NASA had no evidence that the ramp required modification - and thus made the decision not to mess with something not known to be broken.
D.
 Signature Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
John Doe - 22 Oct 2005 01:40 GMT > 1) The PAL ramp has not in the past caused problems. NASA made the > decision to not fiddle with something that works. (And had they > fiddled with it and it broke off - you'd be among the first to bitch > about it.) That is an EXCUSE.
NASA was expected to review all of the foam on the ET, not just one specific location. They told the world the fom issue had been fixed and the shuttle was ready to fly.
Turns out NASA had only looked at one specific location. They supposedly developped new technique to apply the foam to make t safer but only used that technique on that one location and didn't apply it to the other location on the ET.
Pressure or not, the real cost of this is lack of credibility. When NASA next delclares that the FOAM problem has been fixed, unless it can show a complete overhaul of the FOAM issue and construction of a new tank and not some retrofit of an existing one, there won't be much credibility of their claim that all of the ET foam problems have been fixed.
You mentioned Murphy's law. This si different here. There are known issues with how the foam behaves on the ET. It is stupiod of NASA to fix only the areas that break when they know that there are plenty of other unfixed areas that will eventually need to be fixed.
So essentially, for the remainder of the Shuttle's life, each launch will result in foam shedding from a new area of the ET. New study, new report, NASA then fixes that area and declare ET to be fit for flight (again). Lather, rinse, repeat.
For space flight, Murphy's law applies to unknown problems. The Foam is not an unknown problem. lack of due diligence in this case should be considered criminal.
In the end, schedule pressures will result in even greater delays and fewer shuttle flights. Fix it good, fix it once and for all.
rk - 22 Oct 2005 03:24 GMT >> 1) The PAL ramp has not in the past caused problems. NASA made the >> decision to not fiddle with something that works. (And had they [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Turns out NASA had only looked at one specific location. ... [snip] You keep saying this Mezei, but that doesn't make it true, no matter how many times you repeat it.
Indeed, I addressed this very point for you back last September.
<repeat>
Mezei,
No, they didn't "have a huge 'oops, we forgot about this' -- except in your hate-filled mind.
For instance, from space.com
NASA has spent two-and-a-half years redesigning portions of the shuttle's external tank to prevent exactly such foam loss, and early discussions on the need to address the PAL ramp -- which is swathed in thick foam layers -- ended with engineers believing no changes were needed.
Or Parson on spaceref.com
We knew we would have to remove the PAL ramp. We did not have enough data to be safe and remove it. We had very few problems with it so we decided that it was safe to fly it as is.
Clearly, with the event we had, we were wrong.
And from aviationnow.com, last January, over 6 months before the flight:
Work also is underway to eliminate foam shedding from the LO2 Feedline bellows, the LH2 Intertank Flange, and the Protuberance Airload (PAL) ramps, according to Greenfield.
Sorry to have reality intrude on your fantasy, Mezei.
-- rk "Just make sure all crewmembers are jewish. Then you throw a penny into the Soyuz capsule and all 12 will find a way to fit in there" -- JF Mezei, February 8, 2003.
</repeat>
> Pressure or not, the real cost of this is lack of credibility. [ correct ]
Correct, Mezei, you're not credible. Especially when you repeat the same incorrect thing, over and over, and continue to ignore reality.
Do have a good evening, Sir!
-- rk "Just make sure all crewmembers are jewish. Then you throw a penny into the Soyuz capsule and all 12 will find a way to fit in there" -- JF Mezei, February 8, 2003.
George Evans - 22 Oct 2005 06:55 GMT >> 1) The PAL ramp has not in the past caused problems. NASA made the decision >> to not fiddle with something that works. (And had they fiddled with it and [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > technique on that one location and didn't apply it to the other location on > the ET. Apparently you didn't read the article carefully. NASA looked at at least three areas, the bipod ramp, the forward part of the PAL ramp, and the aft part of the PAL ramp.
"Another area of concern was a Protuberance Air Load ramp that runs along the side of the 15-story tank. It ensures smooth airflow around fuel pressurization lines and a cable tray. Some engineers considered the 37-foot ramp a potential source of debris and wanted to replace it.
"The first 10 feet of the ramp were removed to make a separate safety modification. That area was covered with a new type of foam applied with a more exacting technique designed to prevent shedding. Ultimately, no foam was lost from the area during Discovery's flight.
"NASA managers decided not to replace the remainder of the ramp."
<snip>
> For space flight, Murphy's law applies to unknown problems. The Foam is > not an unknown problem. lack of due diligence in this case should be > considered criminal. From the article that we are discussing it is clear that NASA introduced an "unknown" by changing the forward part of the PAL ramp and leaving a new interface between that and the rest of the ramp.
<snip>
George Evans
John Doe - 22 Oct 2005 09:21 GMT > "The first 10 feet of the ramp were removed to make a separate safety > modification. Shouldn't they have taken a naked tank and applied foam from A to Z using the new techniques instead of trying to retrofit an old tank ?
Since Columbia, they had plenty of time to build a new naked tank and apply fom once they had found the right installation method and foam type.
George Evans - 22 Oct 2005 18:50 GMT >> "The first 10 feet of the ramp were removed to make a separate safety >> modification. [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Since Columbia, they had plenty of time to build a new naked tank and apply > fom once they had found the right installation method and foam type. Why start all over? Like I said, after reading the CAIB report, I would be willing to take a seat on any of the remaining shuttle flights even with the ET foam configuration Columbia used. Don't fix what ain't broke.
George Evans
Andrew Lotosky - 22 Oct 2005 19:00 GMT > "Another area of concern was a Protuberance Air Load ramp that runs along > the side of the 15-story tank. It ensures smooth airflow around fuel [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > "NASA managers decided not to replace the remainder of the ramp." It sounds like whenever a couple engineers in NASA think something that turns out right, but get over-ruled everyone will cry "schedule pressure!" or "management dicking around!" This case just seems like the media's love of the two guys who predicted doom, but were over-ruled by the evil, ignorant managers taken a step to far.
I could see it with Challenger and Columbia, but not here, because I suspect for the three engineers saying "this might be a problem" seven were saying "let's not mess with something we haven't seen fail since 1983". Especially since this time, when NASA found a problem they did exactly what they should have done when O-ring burn-throughs were noticed, and large foam loss was becoming an issue. They ceased flying.
-A.L.
Fred J. McCall - 23 Oct 2005 04:57 GMT :> 1) The PAL ramp has not in the past caused problems. NASA made the :> decision to not fiddle with something that works. (And had they :> fiddled with it and it broke off - you'd be among the first to bitch :> about it.) : :That is an EXCUSE. <snip>
:In the end, schedule pressures will result in even greater delays and :fewer shuttle flights. Fix it good, fix it once and for all. Get a clue. Oh, and while you're at it, grow the nuts to use your real name.
 Signature "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Dryden
Herb Schaltegger - 23 Oct 2005 15:11 GMT > Get a clue. Oh, and while you're at it, grow the nuts to use your > real name. His name is J.F. Mezei, an anti-Semitic usenet troll known for a weird fixation on (perceived) sexual and excretory issues in space flight, as well as knee-jerk anti-Americanism in all forms.
He also generally posts from an ancient Mac running Netscape 4.8 - a free clue that he's an unemployed loon posting from his parents' basement. :-/
 Signature "Fame may be fleeting but obscurity is forever." ~Anonymous "I believe as little as possible and know as much as I can." ~Todd Stuart Phillips <www.angryherb.net>
Monte Davis - 23 Oct 2005 18:09 GMT John Doe <jdoe@doe.org> wrote:
>Fix it good, fix it once and for all. In other words, find a once-for-all solution to the challenge of bonding a light, porous material to metal, with an inside-to-outside temperature delta of several hundred degrees, and making it stick flawlessly through some minutes of high G and strong aerodynamic forces that vary extremely rapidly both second-to-second and place-to-place over the surface of the tank? And if that's not possible, redesign the ET from scratch, or else redesign the whole STS to put the orbiter on top (with all the new problems that would bring)?
One could ask: how many billions are you bringing to the task? Or one could ask: if you think the shuttle should be retired at once, why not say so instead of crying for the moon?
Bob Haller - 23 Oct 2005 18:32 GMT I think the task is impossible and the shuttles should be retired yesterday....
Pass a special bill in congress top keep the NASA workers on the payroll.
first those necessary for NEW program keep working:)
Those due to retire get special sweetheart deal, retire them early bonus $$$
for those remaining, find them work:)
Give them full pay to be shuttle museum guides near their homes
lots of maintence for pad workers, plus conversion work.
for all remaining....
Set up college or graduate/ post graduate classes to futher their education, or other make work programs to keep them busy and paying taxes, or a option for a BIG Bonus if they leave temporarily then return as soon as needed!
something like regular unemployment, full health insurance during the hiatus, then once recalled after 2 years on the job 25% of the costs saved by voluntary time off!
Its possible to have a flight stand down and not hurt anyone! While keeping the needed workforce together, espically if shuttle derived is the path choosen.
compensation package shouldnt come out of regular nasa budget, but a special appropiation from congress
John Doe - 24 Oct 2005 02:08 GMT > place-to-place over the surface of the tank? And if that's not > possible, redesign the ET from scratch, or else redesign the whole STS [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > could ask: if you think the shuttle should be retired at once, why not > say so instead of crying for the moon? I am one who advocates pushing back the 2010 deadline because the Shuttle has remained grounded for far longer than the CAIB had anticipated. So no, I cannot be accused of wanting the shuttle grounded now. It should at the very least complete the station and bring back hubble.
The problem lies in the nasa stating that the foam problem had been fixed and that NASA had complied with CAIB recommedations and that the shuttle was fit to fly according to the new more stringent standards imposed post Columbia.
The expectation was that NASA had fixed the foam problem once and for all. The reality was revealed after Doscovery when it was revealed that NASA had only modified one small section of the ET and not changed other sections known to be problematic dur to shape etc.
rk - 26 Oct 2005 06:11 GMT >> place-to-place over the surface of the tank? And if that's not >> possible, redesign the ET from scratch, or else redesign the whole STS [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > Shuttle has remained grounded for far longer than the CAIB had > anticipated. Well, this is what the CAIB said:
Recertification R9.2-1 Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct a vehicle recertification at the material, component, subsystem, and system levels. Recertification requirements should be included in the Service Life Extension Program.
What you say is not a rationale, Mezei, no matter how many times you repeat it and wave your one free arm. The CAIB said 2010, that's pretty clear. Not perfectly clear but pretty clear.
So, what is your technical justification for violating the CAIB's recommendation? They didn't recommend delaying recertification if the schedule didn't hold up. That's just the schedule pressure forcing decisions that led to two horrible accidents.
Now, you can start with by telling us how the 2010 data was determined for recertification and then go on to discuss why the CAIB data is not valid. Not having particular missions flown is not a valid reason.
> So no, I cannot be accused of wanting the shuttle grounded > now. It should at the very least complete the station and bring back > hubble. Why spend all that money and risk seven lives for no gain in science? Oh, I see, mostly American lives on the Shuttle.
> The problem lies in the nasa stating that the foam problem had been > fixed and that NASA had complied with CAIB recommedations and that the > shuttle was fit to fly according to the new more stringent standards > imposed post Columbia. No, Mezei, this is exactly what NASA said, you need to start paying attention:
Parson on spaceref.com
We knew we would have to remove the PAL ramp. We did not have enough data to be safe and remove it. We had very few problems with it so we decided that it was safe to fly it as is.
Clearly, with the event we had, we were wrong.
> The expectation was that NASA had fixed the foam problem once and for > all. The reality was revealed after Doscovery when it was revealed that > NASA had only modified one small section of the ET and not changed other > sections known to be problematic dur to shape etc. Again, you have to start paying attention, Mezei, here's what they said:
from space.com
NASA has spent two-and-a-half years redesigning portions of the shuttle's external tank to prevent exactly such foam loss, and early discussions on the need to address the PAL ramp -- which is swathed in thick foam layers -- ended with engineers believing no changes were needed.
They were wrong. They admitted it.
 Signature rk "Just make sure all crewmembers are jewish. Then you throw a penny into the Soyuz capsule and all 12 will find a way to fit in there" -- JF Mezei, February 8, 2003.
John Doe - 26 Oct 2005 08:59 GMT > What you say is not a rationale, Mezei, no matter how many times you repeat it > and wave your one free arm. The CAIB said 2010, that's pretty clear. Not > perfectly clear but pretty clear. An no matter how many times you repeat the original CAIB text, you are not accepting the fact that the 2010 deadline was set with the assumption that the shuttle would be operating at "full capacity" between 2004 and 2010. The shuttle won't be operating at full capacity until 2006, so that is a full 2 years of iddle time that the CAIB did not take into consideration.
During those 2 years, none of the shuttles spent time at the pad next to salty water spray. None of them were exposed the the rigors of launch and re-entry, none were exposed to micro meteorites.
The CAIB should have worded their deadline similar to what Soyuz has: once it is launched, it has a 6 month lifetime. The CAIB should have said that Shuttles would have a 6 year lifetime once their return to operation after which they would need to be recertified etc etc. Or they should have specified a formula that combines number of flights with time.
Politicians have used the 2010 as a hard deadline. This does not mean that the CAIB couldn't TECHNICALLY review the date and say that due to the extended grounding, the shuttle could fly an extra year or two before the requirements for recertification come in. Politicians could then decide whether 2010 deadline remains or whether NASA can be allowed to complete its mission.
The government and CAIB should agree to allow 19 shuttle flights, or 6 years of operation, whichever comes first.
If they made that commitment, the rest of the ISS partners would know what to expect. (but not When to expect it). But at least there would be a firm commitment. The constant waivering between the 18 ISS flights, 2 usuless ISS flighst per year or total cancellation of shuttle do not help the image of NASA.
Earlier in the ISS history, americans were constantly criticising Russia's apparent lack of funding for Soyuz/Progress. The table has turned and now it is the USA that looks like a poor unreliable partner unable to fullfill its obligations.
rk - 26 Oct 2005 12:40 GMT [ snip ]
Troll? Did you say troll Mezei? Let's see what a real troll looks like.
Well, as a case study of excellence in trolling, we have the most logical and ethical leader of the Mezei Regime, broadcasting fake releases of the President of the United States of America's plane being shot down!
Now that's a troll!
<mezei regime>
http://groups.google.com/groups?as_q=&num=10 &scoring=r&hl=en&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ugroup=&as_usubject=Air+Force+1 +down&as_uauthors=&lr=&as_drrb=q&as_qdr=&as_mind=1&as_minm=1&as_miny=1981 &as_maxd=26&as_maxm=10&as_maxy=2005&safe=off
Message-ID: <1113268253.41906492d687da6ab43591f48e19dd11@teranews>
From: nobody <nobody@nobody.org> Newsgroups: rec.travel.air Subject: FOX TV reports Air Force 1 down
FOX television reports that shortly after 23:00, Air Force 1 was shot down by a US stealth bomber somewhere in Nevada. President's life unknown at this point,
[ snip ]
</mezei regime>
Yes, Mezei, you are a true inspiration to world peace!
Have a good day, Sir!!!!!!!
Oh, and you're a bigot, too.
 Signature rk "Just make sure all crewmembers are jewish. Then you throw a penny into the Soyuz capsule and all 12 will find a way to fit in there" -- JF Mezei, February 8, 2003.
rk - 26 Oct 2005 13:05 GMT Ah, starting off with name calling. I note that that type of rhetoric rarely succeeds in persuading people in a technical discussion. Indeed, it's usually a sign that one has lost. Perhaps you should go back to writing fake press releases of al Qaeda buying more Boeing planes to kill more innocent civilians? After all, you endorse such killings:
<Mezei Regime>
The second amerians re-elected Bush with an even greater majority, knowing that he was a war criminal, the citizens became accomplices in his war crimes. Same applies to the british and australians. All those citizens are fair game for people who wish to seek revenge for the war crimes perpetrated by those countries.
</Mezei Regime>
Now that we've addressed that little temper tantrum of yours, let's move ahead, shall we, Professor?
>> What you say is not a rationale, Mezei, no matter how many times you >> repeat it and wave your one free arm. The CAIB said 2010, that's pretty >> clear. Not perfectly clear but pretty clear. > > An no matter how many times you repeat the original CAIB text, Ah, I see that you conveniently snip out actual facts! No matter how many times you try your "argument by snipping" technique, it doesn't work! Who exactly do you think it fools?
If you are going to discuss the CAIBs position and how you wish to have policy that goes against the CAIB, you should listen to what the CAIB says as a starting point. But you choose to delete it. Hmmm ... I wonder why.
So, we shall restore the actual facts [they hate when facts are actually used, so please bare with me]:
<restoring facts>
Recertification R9.2-1 Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct a vehicle recertification at the material, component, subsystem, and system levels. Recertification requirements should be included in the Service Life Extension Program.
</restoring facts>
> you are > not accepting the fact that the 2010 deadline was set with the > assumption that the shuttle would be operating at "full capacity" > between 2004 and 2010. Now, you choose to delete facts.
Show me the following facts, Mezei:
1. It was an assumption that the Shuttle would be operating at "full capacity" between 2004 and 2010 2. The CAIB statement to have the shuttle recertified after 2010, which is an engineering assessment, had anything to do with the operational schedules you cite in your "fact" number 1. 3. That the laws of physics allow you essentially postpone time since all aging affects will be nullified since the operational schedule in your "fact" number was not met.
So, "show me the facts, Mezei!"
> The shuttle won't be operating at full capacity > until 2006, so that is a full 2 years of iddle time that the CAIB did > not take into consideration. The CAIB specified a date. Please show me the "facts" above.
If you can show me where in the CAIB report the CAIB planned the operational schedule for the space shuttle, I'd be most glad to read that. I might have missed that section of the CAIB report, I read it all (not all of the Appendices), so I might have missed it.
> During those 2 years, none of the shuttles spent time at the pad next to > salty water spray. None of them were exposed the the rigors of launch > and re-entry, none were exposed to micro meteorites. And as you were told before, previously, those are not the only aging effects. You can continue to ignore reality as much as you want, Mezei, but the onus is on you to show that those are the only factors that the CAIB considered for their recertification date and that they are the only factors that would matter in any recertification date.
Your attitude towards safety with your one-arm waving engineering is what gets people killed.
I note that the CAIB did not specify the number of launch cycles or time in elements. Many organizations do do exactly that. But the CAIB chose not to do that. So what do you know about the CAIBs assessment that allows you to change what they said?
> The CAIB should have worded their deadline similar to what Soyuz has: > once it is launched, it has a 6 month lifetime. The CAIB should have > said that Shuttles would have a 6 year lifetime once their return to > operation after which they would need to be recertified etc etc. Or they > should have specified a formula that combines number of flights with > time. Should have? Please show the engineering that supports that they should have.
Now, you might have wanted them to word it that way but they didn't. You can argue with their 2010 date all you want on engineering terms, but you fail to do that. And do you think that the CAIB and their consultants were all that dumb and only you see the proper way to word it? Or do you think that they had real concerns there?
Of course, anyone with any knowledge at all knows that your engineering analysis is bunk. And it only takes one case to disprove a "theory" such as yours, which has already been done.
So, you can wish that they worded their requirement a certain way but they didn't. So the onus is on you to show that they blew it and prove your case for safety.
> Politicians have used the 2010 as a hard deadline. Politicians have set the retirement date of 2010 for the Shuttle which happens to coincide with the date for recertification. If you can show me some cost numbers for recertification, the effects on available manpower for performing the certification, the effects on launch schedule for hardware downtime for recertification, and also the practicality of performing this recertification, then go ahead.
They made a decision. I don't see any data to support a different decision. Many people make good cases to retire it earlier.
> This does not mean > that the CAIB couldn't TECHNICALLY review the date and say that due to > the extended grounding, the shuttle could fly an extra year or two > before the requirements for recertification come in. There is no more CAIB, Mezei. Pay attention.
Note that I don't see any statements from the CAIB members arguing against this decision in the press. They are all free to speak as individuals and they have done so in the past on other issues. So please show me what the individual CAIB members have said on this issue.
Or do you think that there is some giant conspiracy where all of the CAIB members and their staffers see their Recommendation being used to retire the Shuttle in 2010 which is not what they wanted and they all remain so silent?
> Politicians could > then decide whether 2010 deadline remains or whether NASA can be allowed > to complete its mission. A lot of assumptions there, Mezei. The CAIB made a recommendation and I don't see them arguing that Dubya's retirement date violates their intent. Or do you think that all of the CAIB members are so anti-USA that they want the Shuttle program, NASA's only manned space flight capability, needlessly shut down to hurt the US space program and the US technical image in the world?
You make the common mistake of viewing everyone through your own mindset, assuming that everyone has the hate for the USA that you do.
> The government and CAIB should agree to allow 19 shuttle flights, or 6 > years of operation, whichever comes first. Why should they? What's the technical basis for the CAIB changing their stated position? There might be a great one, you just refuse to show it. And as we know, your arguments are full of holes. Heck, your best argument to date is name calling!
> If they made that commitment, the rest of the ISS partners would know > what to expect. (but not When to expect it). But at least there would be > a firm commitment. The constant waivering between the 18 ISS flights, 2 > usuless ISS flighst per year or total cancellation of shuttle do not > help the image of NASA. The CAIB was not a PR effort, Mezei. Please pay attention.
> Earlier in the ISS history, americans were constantly criticising > Russia's apparent lack of funding for Soyuz/Progress. The table has > turned and now it is the USA that looks like a poor unreliable partner > unable to fullfill its obligations. And what has that have to do with the CAIB recommendation? I find it interesting that you snip out the recommendation that is being discussed and put in your political hate. Hey, Mezei, you're a troll!
And if you wanted to be fair, you'd mention how the USA bailed out the Russian program for many years and kept Mir flying.
Now, you have failed to show any "facts" and chose to live in a world that is Just Fantasy, Mezei.
Oh, and you're a bigot, too.
 Signature rk "Just make sure all crewmembers are jewish. Then you throw a penny into the Soyuz capsule and all 12 will find a way to fit in there" -- JF Mezei, February 8, 2003.
Bob Haller - 26 Oct 2005 13:28 GMT If NASA ended shuttle flying on the day columbia was lost we would be much closer to a replacement, sadly its years of wasted time studying something everyone knows, its time for a replacement.
nasa intentionally tied ISS modules to shuttle to keep it flying longer.
If it werent for those modules few people would care.
incidently if the reduced flight schedule doesnt include launching the international partners modules then thats another reason to end the shuttle immediately
Andrew Lotosky - 26 Oct 2005 14:58 GMT > incidently if the reduced flight schedule doesnt include launching the > international partners modules then thats another reason to end the > shuttle immediately Um...as I understand two items were deleted from the new "18-19" flight plan.
A Russian and Japanese component.
-A.L.
Jorge R. Frank - 26 Oct 2005 15:04 GMT "Andrew Lotosky" <skylon@gmail.com> wrote in news:1130335100.914017.142260 @g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> incidently if the reduced flight schedule doesnt include launching the >> international partners modules then thats another reason to end the [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > A Russian and Japanese component. Half right. The Russian component was the Science Power Module, which the US agreed to fly on the shuttle in barter for other services back during the Zvezda delays.
The Japanese are building the Centrifuge Accommodation Module, but it's US- owned (the Japanese built it in barter for the three launches required to assemble and outfit JEM).
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Derek Lyons - 26 Oct 2005 16:52 GMT >"Andrew Lotosky" <skylon@gmail.com> wrote in news:1130335100.914017.142260 >@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com: [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] >US agreed to fly on the shuttle in barter for other services back during >the Zvezda delays. IIRC the Science Power Module is largely vaporware anyhow.
D.
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Jorge R. Frank - 27 Oct 2005 00:27 GMT >>"Andrew Lotosky" <skylon@gmail.com> wrote in >>news:1130335100.914017.142260 @g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com: [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > IIRC the Science Power Module is largely vaporware anyhow. Right. Which is one reason the Russians won't be terribly upset (though they may make a public show of being upset) about it being cancelled, especially since NASA proposes to make up for it by providing more power from the US segment.
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George Evans - 22 Oct 2005 06:35 GMT >> Okay, is this article basically accusing NASA of not redesigning the PAL >> ramp? [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > minimize voids in the foam. More, bigger voids increase the chances of foam > coming off. The CAIB found that voids were not sufficient to cause foam detachment. Voids are not the problem, but introducing a new interface horizontal to air flow, between two kinds of foam, might be. The divot left on the tank in the photo looks suspiciously like the shedding might have started at the interface.
George Evans
Brian Gaff - 21 Oct 2005 16:29 GMT Whether you want to try to justify risk of flying or not, I do think that having some years where no manned vehicle from the US is usable, would, with the US's current bad name in the world, make it extremely difficult to point at the US as a technological leader in the world, no matter what spin you put on it.
How dangerous, is dangerous?
Is it a money thing?
Space flight is dangerous, and because you cannot actually quantify the risk of complex engineering, which will always have compromises, you can neve answer the question. In the old days, I guess we were all naive enough to imagine heaven and earth was moved to keep the brave astronauts safe, but now its all down to the fact that cost, design constraints etc, all play a part, people suspect the public will be on their case at every turn.
If that were the case, why did you go to war? I know people who sign up for the Military know they might die, etc... well, I still think that history will not be so unkind to the Shuttle as many are today.
Brian
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> Rats you beat me to it..... I was about to post it! > [quoted text clipped - 88 lines] > Said Gilbrech: "When you can, you would like to be able to set a crisp > requirement and then set out to meet it, and not proceed until you do." Bob Haller - 22 Oct 2005 02:52 GMT Just WHAT has the shuttles 30 years of flying accomplished that was earth shattering?
Has there EVER been a flight that lost no foam?
NASA promised the foam was fixed, and sadly cut too many corners, how many times will nasa promise again the foam was fixed?
Bob Haller - 22 Oct 2005 03:40 GMT I think a hiatus, while designing and building the moon mars plan is acceptable and probably to be expected.
its not like were saying the heck with manned space indefinetely
George Evans - 22 Oct 2005 06:40 GMT <snip>
> Space flight is dangerous, and because you cannot actually quantify the risk > of complex engineering, which will always have compromises, you can neve [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > the Military know they might die, etc... well, I still think that history will > not be so unkind to the Shuttle as many are today. Amen. I'm sorry but someone has to say it. Some of the guys in this group are just pansies. There is no other way to say it.
George Evans
George Evans - 22 Oct 2005 06:20 GMT > Report: NASA caved to schedule, Pressure contributed to Discovery's foam > shedding, investigators say [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > culture" hasn't changed as much since the Columbia disaster as some would > like to believe. Thank goodness! It sounds like the more they futz with the ET, trying to satisfy increased safety requirements, the less safe the system gets. Heck, after reading the CAIB report I would be willing to fly on any of the next 19 flights even with the old *bipod* ramps in place and no PAL modifications.
And how melodramatic can an article get? ..."foam shedding that endangered astronauts"..."nearly striking Discovery's right wing"...
George Evans
Bob Haller - 22 Oct 2005 15:32 GMT Look the foam loss might have cost us another orbiter.....
With astronauts stuck at a station thatr cant support them, and with foam loss we couldnt have sent another shuttle to pick them up.
The lack of spare soyuz and progress is running on the edge, and deplorable
Jorge R. Frank - 22 Oct 2005 15:59 GMT "Bob Haller" <hallerb@aol.com> wrote in news:1129991526.760700.39680 @g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> Look the foam loss might have cost us another orbiter..... > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > The lack of spare soyuz and progress is running on the edge, and > deplorable Make up your mind, Bbo. Six days ago you said the US would never pay for Soyuz due to continued proliferation of Russian missile and nuclear technology to Iran. So just where do you think the money for all those spare Soyuzes and Progresses is going to come from?
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Bob Haller - 22 Oct 2005 17:40 GMT <
Make up your mind, Bbo. Six days ago you said the US would never pay for Soyuz due to continued proliferation of Russian missile and nuclear technology to Iran. So just where do you think the money for all those spare Soyuzes and Progresses is going to come from?
-- JRF >
thats true issue, should the US be a partner with a country spreading nuclear weapons to 3rd world unstable places like Iran?
But the fact remains we are a partner in ISS, and as such have a duty and responsiblity to run it right, or not do it at all.....
the lack of any emergency soyuz and progress, may one day cause a disaster.
MANNED SPACE OPERATIONS ARE HIGH RISK. ITS IMPORTANT TO BUILD ENOUGH REDUNDANCY FOR TOLERANCE OF TROUBLES.
TO DO ANY LESS IN THIS DAY AND AGE IS CRIMINAL...........
Bob Haller - 22 Oct 2005 23:20 GMT !!!!The investigator team is the second group to find NASA caved to schedule pressure during its bid to return its shuttle fleet to service,!!!
What more do we need to know, nasa managers still dont get it.
When you forget the lessons of the past you will make the same mistake again:(
John Doe - 23 Oct 2005 03:14 GMT > Make up your mind, Bbo. Six days ago you said the US would never pay for > Soyuz due to continued proliferation of Russian missile and nuclear > technology to Iran. So just where do you think the money for all those > spare Soyuzes and Progresses is going to come from? Sinple. Bush will contract with Oliver North to find a way to send money to Iran so that Iran can then channel the money to Russia to buy the seats on Soyuz. Bush then ets Altzheimer's towards the end of his mandate so that when this all comes public, he can say he doesn't remember ever doing any of this.
:-)
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