Why the final years of the shuttle have the most risk;(

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bob haller - 25 Sep 2004 12:54 GMT

Its my belief the 2010 deadline means the last few years of the shuttle will
alnmost certinally kill another crew.

First off the system is old, parts manufacturers long gone out of business,
cost cutting to attempt to keep the vehicle flying, like those malfunctioning
bolts. Plus with that date, wether or not its firm the agency will not want to
sink big bucks into improvements. Just as if your planning on trading a car you
dont rebuild the engine. add stop leak and keep going. Plus as things winddown
exerienced workers will move to jobs elsewhere. Just when you need the sharpest
people they will have departed. Thats already a problem with the aging
workforce. FBC by whatever name cut employees en mass, the people who would of
been highly experienced replacements today:(

Well our shuttles safety wasnt good before this, just ask the familys of 2 dead
crew. But its destined to get worse and cost us more lives.

This is why I hope one of these hurricanes damage the system so bad it cant
return to flight ever. Any disaster that takes out the shuttles while sparring
others saves us watching another crew die.

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Joe D. - 25 Sep 2004 16:53 GMT

> Its my belief the 2010 deadline means the last few years of the
> shuttle will almost certinally kill another crew.
>
> First off the system is old, parts manufacturers long gone out
> of business, cost cutting to attempt to keep the vehicle flying...

Overall the situation is the exact opposite. The final years will have
much lower risk.

Pre-51L, there was significant risk relative to present day, especially
on ascent (the riskiest part). There was no bailout capability, no pressure
suits, engines and turbopumps less reliable, and no east coast contingency
aborts. A three out SSME before SRB sep would have likely caused
loss of crew and vehicle due to shearing the ET attach struts.

A good example of the risk was 51-F, where despite being late the
the ascent with high energy (345 sec and 13,000 ft/sec) a single SSME
failure almost caused a transatlantic abort (they marginally had enough
delta-V for abort to orbit). A 2nd SSME almost shut down due to a
spurious overtemp, prevented only by a quick-thinking flight controller.
Had this happened with 15-20 sec of the 1st, they'd have had
insufficient energy for a transatlantic abort and with no bailout, nor
survivable ditching option, crew and vehicle would have been lost.

By contrast today there are many more survivable abort options on ascent.

In addition to ascent safety improvements, the Columbia loss has
spurred significant safety improvements in the reentry/descent phase.

Yes it's a highly complex machine and you can always lose one for various
reasons. I'm not saying vehicle aging and personnel attrition will have
no adverse affect. However viewed as a whole the safety improvements
far outweigh this. If I had the choice of flying the very last mission, or
one of the pre-51L missions, I'd far rather fly the last one from a safety
standpoint.

-- Joe D.

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MasterShrink - 25 Sep 2004 18:44 GMT

>Yes it's a highly complex machine and you can always lose one for various
>reasons. I'm not saying vehicle aging and personnel attrition will have
>no adverse affect. However viewed as a whole the safety improvements
>far outweigh this. If I had the choice of flying the very last mission, or
>one of the pre-51L missions, I'd far rather fly the last one from a safety
>standpoint.

How many shuttle missions exactly are left? The unofficial launch guide
(http://www.sworld.com.au/steven/space/shuttle/manifest.txt) goes up to STS
137. If that would indeed complete ISS then the shuttle would be retired as is
currently proposed by the president.

That would also mean 23 flights remain on the books.

-A.L.

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Space Forum / Shuttle / September 2004

Why the final years of the shuttle have the most risk;(