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Space Forum / Shuttle / July 2004National Space Policy: NSDD-42 (issued on July 4th, 1982)
National Space Policy National Security Decision Directive 42 July 4, 1982 http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/new/policy/nsdd-42.htm Complete text: ================================================================ Available in NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. Page references to original document in brackets. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Editorial headnote: In 1981, its first year in office, the Reagan administration issued a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-8, November 13, 1981) that reiterated the central role of the Space Transportation System in U.S. space activities. The White House then initiated a comprehensive space policy review under the direction of new Science Adviser George Keyworth II. The results of that review were contained in NSDD-42, issued on July 4, 1982. This directive replaced NSDD-8 and the three Carter administration space policy statements, NSDD-37, 42, and 54. It also established as the primary forum for space policy formulation the National Security Council Senior Interagency Group (Space)--SIG (Space)--chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. SIG (Space) was the locus of policymaking throughout the two terms that Ronald Reagan was President. -- Roger D. Launius, NASA Chief Historian] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] July 4, 1982 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 42 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY I. INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPLES This directive establishes national policy to guide the conduct of United States space program and related activities; it supersedes Presidential Directives 37, 42, and 54, as well as National Security Decision Directive 8. This directive is consistent with and augments the guidance contained in existing directives, executive orders, and law. The decisions outlined in this directive provide the broad framework and the basis for the commitments necessary for the conduct of United States space programs. The Space Shuttle is to be a major factor in the future evolution of United States space programs. It will continue to foster cooperation between the national security and civil efforts to ensure efficient and effective use of national resources. Specifically, routine use of the manned Space Shuttle will provide the opportunity to understand better and evaluate the role of man in space, to increase the utility of space programs, and to expand knowledge of the space environment. The basic goals of United States space policy are to: (a) strengthen the security of the United States; (b) maintain United States space leadership; (c) obtain economic and scientific benefits through the exploitation of space; (d) expand United States private-sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities; (e) promote international cooperative activities that are in the national interest; and (f) cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind. [2] The United States space program shall be conducted in accordance with the following basic principles: A. The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. [Sentence deleted during declassification review] B. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data from space. C. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through the operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as infringement upon sovereign rights. D. The United States encourages domestic commercial exploration of space capabilities, technology, and systems for national economic benefit. These activities must be consistent with national security concerns, treaties, and international agreements. E. The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits for the nation. F. [Paragraph deleted in declassification review] G. The United States Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space launch system for both national security and civil government missions. STS capabilities and capacities shall be developed to meet appropriate national needs and shall be available to authorized users -- domestic and foreign, commercial, and governmental. [3] H. The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its right of self-defense. I. The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems should those measures be compatible with United States national security. The United States will oppose arms control concepts or legal regimes that seek general prohibitions on the military or intelligence use of space. II. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM The Space Transportation System (STS) is composed of the Space shuttle, associated upper stages, and related facilities. The following policies shall govern the development and operation of the STS: A. The STS is a vital element of the United States space program and is the primary space launch system for both United States national security and civil government missions. The STS will be afforded the degree of survivability and security protection required for a critical national space resource. B. The first priority of the STS program is to make the system fully operational and cost-effective in providing routine access to space. C. The United States is fully committed to maintaining world leadership in space transportation with an STS capacity sufficient to meet appropriate national needs. The STS program requires sustained commitments by all affected departments and agencies. The United States will continue to develop the STS through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DoD). Enhancements of STS operational capability, upper stages, and efficient methods of deploying and retrieving payloads should be pursued as national requirements are defined. D. United States Government spacecraft should be designed to take advantage of the unique capabilities of the STS. The completion of transition to the Shuttle should occur as expeditiously as practical. [4] E. [Paragraph deleted in declassification review] F. Expandable launch vehicle operations shall be continued by the United States Government until the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and obligations. Unique national security considerations may dictate developing special-purpose launch capabilities. G. For the near-term, the STS will continue to be managed and operated in an institutional arrangement consistent with the current NASA/DoD Memoranda of Understanding. Responsibility will remain in NASA for operational control of the STS for civil missions and in the DoD for operational control of the STS for national security missions. Mission management is the responsibility of the mission agency. As the STS operations mature, options will be considered for possible transition to a different institutional structure. H. Major changes to STS program capabilities will require Presidential approval. III. CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM The United States shall conduct civil space programs to expand knowledge of the Earth, its environment, the solar system, and the universe; to develop and promote selected civil applications of space technology; to preserve the United States leadership in critical aspects of space science, applications, and technology; and to further United States domestic and foreign policy objectives. Consistent with the National Aeronautics and Space Act, the following policies shall govern the conduct of the civil space program. A. Science, Applications, and Technology: United States Government civil programs shall continue a balanced strategy of research, development, operations, and exploration for science, applications, and technology. The key objectives of these programs are to: (1) Preserve the United States preeminence in critical major space activities to enable continued exploitation and exploration of space. [5] (2) Conduct research and experimentation to expand understanding of: (a) astrophysical phenomena and the origin and evolution of the universe, through long-term astrophysical observation; (b) the Earth, its environment, and its dynamic relation with the Sun; (c) the origin and evolution of the solar system, through solar, planetary, and lunar sciences and exploration; and (d) the space environment and technology required to advance knowledge in the biological sciences. (3) Continue to explore the requirements, operational concepts, and technology associated with permanent space facilities. (4) Conduct appropriate research and experimentation in advanced technology and systems to provide a basis for future civil space applications. B. Private Sector Participation: The United States Government will provide a climate conducive to expanded private sector investment and involvement in civil space activities, with due regard to public safety and national security. Private sector space activities will be authorized and supervised or regulated by the government to the extent required by treaty and national security. C. International Cooperation: United States cooperation in international civil activities will: (1) Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from Federal civil systems to foreign ground stations and provision of data to foreign users under specified conditions. (2) Continue cooperation with other nations by conducting joint scientific and research programs that yield sufficient benefits to the United States in areas such as access to foreign scientific and technological expertise, and access to foreign research and development facilities, and that serve other national goals. All international space ventures must be consistent with United States technology-transfer policy. D. Civil Operational Remote Sensing: Management of Federal civil operational remote sensing is the responsibility of the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce will: (a) aggregate Federal needs for civil operational remote sensing to be met by either the private sector or the Federal government; (b) identify needed civil operational system research and development objectives; and (c) in coordination with other departments or agencies, provide for regulation of private-sector operational remote sensing systems. [6] [Page deleted in declassification review] [7] [Page deleted in declassification review] [8] [Paragraph deleted in declassification review] (1) The fact that the United States conducts satellite photoreconnaissance for peaceful purposes, including intelligence collection and the monitoring of arms control agreements, is unclassified. The fact that such photoreconnaissance includes a near-real-time capability and is used to provide defense related information for indications and warning is also unclassified. All other details, facts and products concerning the national foreign intelligence space program are subject to appropriate classification and security controls. (2) [Paragraph deleted in declassification review] VI. INTER-SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES [Paragraphs A-F deleted in declassification review] [9] G. The United States Government will maintain and coordinate separate national security and civil operational space systems when differing needs of the sectors dictate. VII. IMPLEMENTATION Normal interagency coordinating mechanisms will be employed to the maximum extent possible to implement the policies enunciated in this directive. To provide a forum to all Federal agencies for their policy views, to review and advise on proposed changes to national space policy, and to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues to the President for decisions as necessary, a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on Space shall be established. The SIG (Space) will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and will include the Deputy or Under Secretary of State, Deputy or Under Secretary of Defense, Deputy or Under Secretary of Commerce, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the [10] Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy will be include as observers. Other agencies or departments will participate based on the subjects to be addressed. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In rememberance of Ronald Reagan today, perhaps someone would like to comment on how he used NASA to help bring an end to the Cold War. Two recent messages: news:<d3af8584.0406061659.1bc91776@posting.google.com> news:<d3af8584.0405291553.abf8e5c@posting.google.com> ~ CT > In rememberance of Ronald Reagan today, perhaps someone would like to > comment on how he used NASA to help bring an end to the Cold War. NSDD-42 spelled it out very clearly how Reagan was using NASA for military purposes. One statement that didn't jibe was this: "The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. [Sentence deleted during declassification review]" In the preceding paragraph, the policy had just spelled out that the top priority was national security, and then right on it's heels they want to maintain that this security goal is going to be accomplished in accordance with the principle of using space for peaceful purposes benefiting all nations. Hmm. Reagan certainly didn't show much desire for benefit of Communist nations. His goal was to defeat those nations. Space was being used to terrorize. This was the standard policy of "advanced nations" who possessed nuclear ballistic missiles. The reason why national security was the top priority for Reagan's space policy (as well as Carter, Ford, Nixon, Johnson, and Ike before him) was because of living under the threat of being vaporized within a matter of minutes. The terror that most people concern themselves with today are mere firecrackers in comparison to a nuclear onslaught. Strangely, many prefer the mindset that ICBMs do not count against the US stated policy of using space "for peaceful purposes". Some simply choose to ignore ICBMs as a space weapon. Others apply a reasoning that since ICBMs sit in silos on the ground, then they aren't space weapons. That would be like reasoning that nuclear bombers sitting in their alert huts do not count as aviation weapons. Along with such missiles, it is also curious to note that at the time NSDD-42 was drafted, the Navstar/GPS program was well on its way with seven Block 1 satellites already in orbit. GPS was designed and funded as a system that would get nuclear warheads to their targets more accurately. Aside from the obvious application of bomber navigation, GPS technology was developed from a system that was designed to improve guidance and control of ICBMs themselves (I searched the sci.space archives and could not find a single comment on MOSAIC, MObile System for Accurate ICBM Control). ...so much for the use of outer space for "peaceful purposes" for the "benefit of all mankind". Reagan clearly backed the use of the space shuttle as a militarily operated vehicle, carrying military payloads, flown by military crews. (An interesting side question that I haven't heard anyone ask is whether it was improper to fly the space shuttle on such overtly military missions without painting military insignias on the vehicle.) And of course, today's ISS came from the Reagan approved program that fit with his NSDD-42 policy. Here is the anecdotal story of how Reagan arrived at his plan for winning the Cold War: (from http://www.wtntam570.com/script/headline_newsmanager.php?id=301064&pagecontent=n ationalnews&feed_id=59) ------------------------------------------------- If he failed to actually shrink the federal bureaucracy himself, it was because of what he did to end what he called "the evil empire" the Soviet Union. How that came about is a favorite story of one of his military advisers, the late Gen. Vernon Walters, who recounted a meeting that occurred shortly after Reagan first became president. There was a briefing by top security officials on the comparative strengths of the United States and the USSR. "Do we have more guns?" Reagan wanted to know. "No," he was told. "More missiles?" "No." "More ships?" "No." "Well what do we have more of?" Reagan wondered. And somebody tossed out, almost laughingly, "Money." "That's it," said Reagan. "We'll beat them with money." Reagan began a massive military buildup. He demanded a 600-ship Navy. He ordered a Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, popularly known as "Star Wars," a high-tech gamble on intercepting missiles in space. His own experts told him it couldn't work but the Soviets couldn't be sure of that. Moscow tried to keep up, and the USSR went broke. ------------------------------------------------- As much as we have Reagan to thank for leading us to a world where the threat of destruction from space has been amazingly reduced, I'm sad to see these words published on the current Air Force Space Command fact sheet (dated April 2003): "The ICBM force consists of Minuteman III and Peacekeeper missiles that provide the critical component of America's on-alert strategic forces. As the nation's "silent sentinels," ICBMs, and the people who operate them, have remained on continuous around-the-clock alert since 1959 -- longer than any other U.S. strategic force. More than 500 ICBMs are currently on alert in reinforced concrete launch facilities beneath the Great Plains." (From http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=155&page=1) I would like to see bold leadership in Washington DC ask: Are 500 ICBMs necessary? Is "continuous around-the-clock alert since 1959" something that we are proud of? Thanks to people like Ronald Reagan, we no longer live in the Cold War. Having "peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all" is a wonderful ideal to strive for. Although it was not the reality of 1982, nor the reality of today, we can still uphold it as our goal. ~ CT > Reagan clearly backed the use of the space shuttle as a militarily > operated vehicle, carrying military payloads, flown by military crews. > (An interesting side question that I haven't heard anyone ask is > whether it was improper to fly the space shuttle on such overtly > military missions without painting military insignias on the vehicle.) Well, are you asking the question now? Why is it any less proper than sending military personel or goods using civilian aircraft or ships? The mission was not a war-time mission, it didn't involve combat. According to the US Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) the only time it is really required to be identified as a member of a combatant armed forces is when engaged in combat. From Ami Silberman: > > Reagan clearly backed the use of the space shuttle as a militarily > > operated vehicle, carrying military payloads, flown by military crews. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > Well, are you asking the question now? Sure. > Why is it any less proper than sending military personel or goods using > civilian aircraft or ships? The mission was not a war-time mission, it > didn't involve combat. ...and Gary Powers was on vacation taking photos for his scrapbook! (I'll get back to the other question.) > According to the US Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) > the only time it is really required to be identified as a member of a > combatant armed forces is when engaged in combat. I don't know where that came from. In contrast to your statement, consider this direct quote from FM 27-10 (change 1, 15 Jul 76): 8. Situations to Which Law of War Applicable a. Types of Hostilities. ... a state of war may exist prior to or subsequent to the use of force. The outbreak of war is usually accompanied by a declaration of war. (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/Ch1.htm) This says that you don't need a declaration of war. You don't even need combat. (It's easy to see that the US was motivated to stretch the definition so that it covered cold war as well as hot ones.) This FM 27-10 goes on to specify a need for "having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance". (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/Ch3.htm) The extension of land and sea rules of warfare made for very specific guidelines for the use of aircraft: The Hague Rules of Air Warfare The Hague, December, 1922-February, 1923 http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm Excerpts: CHAPTER I-Applicability: Classification and Marks. ARTICLE III A military aircraft shall bear an external mark indicating its nation; and military character. [Note: There are no external markings on military shuttle missions that indicate the military character of its missions (-the original point in question-).] ARTICLE VII The external marks required by the above articles shall be so affixed that they cannot be altered in flight. They shall be as large as is practicable and shall be visible from above, from below and from each side. [Note: Standard markings on USAF, USN, USMC, and USA include distinctive military insignia that comply, more or less, with this Hague standard. Not so for military space shuttle missions.] ... ARTICLE XIV A military aircraft shall be under the command of a person duly commissioned or enlisted in the military service of the State; the crew must be exclusively military. [Note: I'm not aware of any non-military crewmembers who have flown on designated military space missions. Apparent compliance here.] ARTICLE XV Members of the crew of a military aircraft shall wear a fixed distinctive emblem of such character as to be recognizable at a distance in case they become separated from their aircraft. ARTICLE XXVII Any person on board a belligerent or neutral aircraft is to be deemed a spy only if acting clandestinely or on false presences he obtains or seeks to obtain, while in the air, information within belligerent jurisdiction or in the zone of operations of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. ARTICLE XXXII Enemy public aircraft, other than those treated on the same footing private aircraft, shall be subject to confiscation without prize proceedings. ARTICLE XXXVI When an enemy military aircraft falls into the hands of a belligerent, the members of the crew and the passengers, if any, may be made prisoners of war. ... __________ Note: The Rules of Air Warfare was published as the second part of a two part document. Part I was restrictions on the use of wireless telegraphy. It's strange to think that after WWI, the regulation of radios was given priority over the regulation of aircraft. Now let's revisit that question from the top: > Why is it any less proper than sending military personel or goods using > civilian aircraft or ships? The obvious answer is that civilian marked transports being used for military missions are not in compliance with these international standards (and it has been noted that such a practice puts normal airliners and cargo ships at risk of being treated as military targets). But there are also critical differences to note: - US civilian aircraft and ships being used by the military (CRAF/CRAFTS) avoid the territory of hostile nations. <> During the Cold War, the space shuttle routinely flew overhead the USSR (along with China, Cuba, etc). - CRAF/CRAFTS serve logistical functions. <> Space shuttle military missions serve operational functions as well. And these same points can be used to check the situation from the 60s as well. For one example, compare the military insignia on this USAF Gemini: http://www.ninfinger.org/~sven/models/gemini/gb_01.html ...to non-military markings on a NASA Gemini: http://ails.arc.nasa.gov/Images/Space/jpegs/G65-1261_a.jpeg Similar capsules. Similar boosters. Both to be launched from the same military facility. Both to be piloted by active duty military test pilots. Both even accomplishing military objectives in their missions... One conforms to the Hague standard. The other doesn't. For a hypothetical situation where Grissom and Young, say, have to abort and this military crew has their civilian-marked capsule land in hostile territory, that government has grounds for arresting them in a similar manner to how Francis Gary Powers was treated. And if there were to be a high profile trial, we might expect Gus's Kodak camera to be presented as Exhibit A. ~ CT > The Hague Rules of Air Warfare > The Hague, December, 1922-February, 1923 [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > that indicate the military character of its missions (-the original > point in question-).] A space shuttle is an 'aircraft' for relatively brief portions of its mission, and then only for ascent-to-orbit and descent-from-orbit. Its actual mission is carried out in space, where "Rules of Air Warfare" and rules for "military aircraft" do not apply to a spacecraft. >A space shuttle is an 'aircraft' for relatively brief portions of its >mission, and then only for ascent-to-orbit and descent-from-orbit. > >Its actual mission is carried out in space, where "Rules of Air Warfare" >and rules for "military aircraft" do not apply to a spacecraft. Moreover, even when it's an aircraft, it's not a combat aircraft. One can reasonably argue that it's a chartered civilian cargo aircraft -- there is no question that even on military shuttle flights, final control of the vehicle remains with NASA -- and those do not require military markings even when carrying military cargo.  Signature"Think outside the box -- the box isn't our friend." | Henry Spencer -- George Herbert | henry@spsystems.net > > A space shuttle is an 'aircraft' for relatively brief portions of its > > mission, and then only for ascent-to-orbit and descent-from-orbit. [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > vehicle remains with NASA -- and those do not require military markings > even when carrying military cargo. In addition, the shuttle doesn't fly in the airspace of any "enemy" or "adversary" nation. National territory doesn't extend into space; space belongs to everybody. SignatureScott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com From Scott Kozel: > In addition, the shuttle doesn't fly in the airspace of any "enemy" or > "adversary" nation. National territory doesn't extend into space; space > belongs to everybody. The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for killing masses of people. The shuttle program, from the very beginning, has been a willful participant in this militarization of space. Ironic for you to seek its protection by invoking the very treaty that it violates. ~ CT > From Scott Kozel: > [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for > killing masses of people. That's baloney any way you slice it. The U.S. has NOT put any "offensive weaponry" in orbit. The U.S. has put reconnaissance satellites in orbit just like several other nations have. > The shuttle program, from the very beginning, has been a willful > participant in this militarization of space. Ironic for you to seek > its protection by invoking the very treaty that it violates. More baloney. Any way you slice it. SignatureScott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com > The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from > becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, > populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for > killing masses of people. You're claiming that the US has space-based WMD? Where are these offensive weapons platforms hiding? When have they been used? > The shuttle program, from the very beginning, has been a willful > participant in this militarization of space. (On the other hand, the Air Force had to be coerced into the partnership, and quickly distanced itself when it could.) * Newsflash * Do you think that the multi-billion dollar GPS system was launched so that Cadillac could have OnStar? Those remarks were alluding to the comments made earlier in this thread: ---- Along with such missiles, it is also curious to note that at the time NSDD-42 was drafted, the Navstar/GPS program was well on its way with seven Block 1 satellites already in orbit. GPS was designed and funded as a system that would get nuclear warheads to their targets more accurately. Aside from the obvious application of bomber navigation, GPS technology was developed from a system that was designed to improve guidance and control of ICBMs themselves (I searched the sci.space archives and could not find a single comment on MOSAIC, MObile System for Accurate ICBM Control). ---- ~ CT > * Newsflash * > [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > GPS was designed and funded as a system that would get nuclear > warheads to their targets more accurately. You got a source for that statement? GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, and is not a "weapon". > > * Newsflash * > > [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, > and is not a "weapon". It does *now* but it *was* designed, funded and deployed for military use first. Until Clinton required the AF to turn it off, GPS used to have a "feature" that intentionally degraded accuracy by a factor of about 10 to 20, IIRC. That "feature" was turned off in about 1998 or 1999, I think. It shouldn't be too hard to look it up if you want full details. As it is, even the "clean" civilian-use signals provide less accuracy that the still-encrypted military signals. SignatureHerb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer Columbia Loss FAQ: <http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html> >>GPS was designed and funded as a system that would get nuclear >>warheads to their targets more accurately. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, > and is not a "weapon". It is indisputable that GPS was initially funded as a military program. It had many earlier military predecessor systems, such as TRANSIT, SECOR, and TIMATION. DOD provided the considerable funding needed to develop and build out the system. The navy had been using TRANSIT to determine positions of ballistic missile subs, but GPS was faster and operationally superior. It's not surprising that GPS has had many other military and eventually civilian applications, and that the civilian applications are increasingly important, but that doesn't mean the civilian applications were the primary reason the system was built. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR614/MR614.appb.pdf Paul >GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, Hardly. If it was *primarily* for civil uses, it wouldn't be run by the military. Civil uses are encouraged, but when push comes to shove, GPS is a military navigation system and the military makes all the decisions. >and is not a "weapon". That part is correct. Signature"Think outside the box -- the box isn't our friend." | Henry Spencer -- George Herbert | henry@spsystems.net > > GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, > > Hardly. If it was *primarily* for civil uses, it wouldn't be run by the > military. Civil uses are encouraged, but when push comes to shove, GPS is > a military navigation system and the military makes all the decisions. It is correct to say that -today- it is used primarily for civil uses, and is quite useful for (and has revolutionized) civil aerial and surface navigation. It also will take a lot of continued funding to keep a full constellation of GPS satellites in place, and that funding will be provided for civil reasons even if military uses continue to be minor for the next 10 years or more. > > and is not a "weapon". > > That part is correct. That was my main point, as I was disputing the original poster's assertion that GPS was an offensive military system. SignatureScott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com From Scott Kozel: > > > GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, > > [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > provided for civil reasons even if military uses continue to be minor > for the next 10 years or more. ...just as America's interstate highways will be maintained for civil reasons. Just as the internet is provided for civil reasons. Just as spaceflight is provided for civil reasons. Etc. I'm glad to see that civil motivations have overtaken belligerent ones. But let's not forget the original impetus for forking out the *billions* that it took to start these programs. > > > and is not a "weapon". > > > > That part is correct. > > That was my main point, as I was disputing the original poster's > assertion that GPS was an offensive military system. I maintain it as a simple fact that the Defense Navigational Satellite System (NavSTAR-GPS) had the sole funding justification as a capability for offensive military systems (nuke subs and bombers in particular). Lunar rockets and navsat systems are wonderful to have for many peaceful reasons, but when it comes to justifying the funds, there's nothing like *self-preservation* as a primal motivation. ...I'm sure we'd all like to think that were more evolved as a species than that, but upon examination of the track record, there is a noticeable absence of multi-billion dollar programs funded for purely altruistic reasons. ~ CT From Henry Spencer: > >GPS provides for passive navigational purposes primarily for civil uses, > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > That part is correct. ...note that the early name for the NavSTAR-GPS program was DNSS: Defense Navigation Satellite System. ~ CT > > The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from > > becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > (On the other hand, the Air Force had to be coerced into the partnership, > and quickly distanced itself when it could.) Only after delivering a bunch of "drive by" requirements that have had far-reaching repercussions. > The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from > becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, > populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for > killing masses of people. What offensive weaponry, in particular? From Steve Hix: > > The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from > > becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, > > populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for > > killing masses of people. > > What offensive weaponry, in particular? This was addressed early on in this thread. Examples given from that June 12th post are ICBMs as offensive space weaponry, and GPS as providing offensive weaponry capability. The Outer Space Treaty prohibited the *storage* of nuclear warheads in space. It did not prohibit using space as the medium for delivery. And it did not prohibit the use of satellites as an integral part of a military system for delivering nuclear warheads (as GPS was designed to do). ~ CT > From Steve Hix: > > > > > The intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to restrain space from > > > becoming militarized. The United States has militarized space anyway, > > > populating it with offensive weaponry capability that is used for > > > killing masses of people. It was to restrain certain types of militarization. > > What offensive weaponry, in particular? > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > military system for delivering nuclear warheads (as GPS was designed > to do). But "populating" implies storage. ICBMs are offensive ballistic weaponry which travel through space but are not parked there. Can you give some info as to what the "intent" of the Treaty was, and why, if it failed in its intent, it hasn't been updated? My understanding was that it was specifically designed to prevent two things: 1. Orbital bombardment systems, since that would encourage a first strike since there would be a minimal response time. (Which in turn would mean that there wouldn't be time to verify if the strike was real or due to some glitch.) 2. Military interference in space operations. Those points seem to be what the treaty addresses. You left of in your list of "militarized" examples weather and communciations sattelites. None of the above constitutes "offensive weaponry capability that is used for killing masses of people." From Ami Silberman: > > From Steve Hix: > > > What offensive weaponry, in particular? > > [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > as to what the "intent" of the Treaty was, and why, if it failed in its > intent, it hasn't been updated? Its broad intent was to keep us from blowing ourselves up. In this aspect, it succeeded. As far as "populating" in orbit, I was referring specifically here to the constellation of GPS satellites that tie in to nuclear subs, nuclear bombers, and GPS bombs themselves. > My understanding was that it was > specifically designed to prevent two things: [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > You left of in your list of "militarized" examples weather and > communciations sattelites. Yes, I see those as examples of space being militarized. Satcom gives direct link to SIOP forces. WX sats give indirect link. > None of the above constitutes "offensive weaponry capability that is used > for killing masses of people." You might want to consider the fact that satcom was designed as a backup means for transmitting the Emergency War Order for the SIOP (though I'm sure that SAC crews were hoping to get an Emergency Action Message that recalled them). As far as weather sats, they were not funded so that the president could plan a vacation in Moscow. The data they provided was used in strategic offensive plans. ~ CT > From Ami Silberman: > > > From Steve Hix: [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > > This was addressed early on in this thread. Examples given from that > > > June 12th post are ICBMs as offensive space weaponry, They're just *very* long-range artillery. Not space-based currently, either. > > > and GPS as providing offensive weaponry capability. Among *thousands* of other uses. You might as well class penicillin, ambulances, packaged food as offensive weapons. Try again. > > From Ami Silberman: > > > > From Steve Hix: [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > > Try again. From Steve Hix: news:<sehix-41C826.22365316062004@dsl081-079-101.sfo1.dsl.speakeasy.net>... > > As far as "populating" in orbit, I was referring specifically here to > > the constellation of GPS satellites that tie in to nuclear subs, [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > Again, you might as well class cell phones as offensive weapons. The fact that offensive nuclear strike capability was the primary driver for developing and funding NavSTAR-GPS is not lost to everyone. _________________ http://www.trimble.com/gps/dod.html Why Did the Department of Defense Develop GPS? In the latter days of the arms race the targeting of ICBMs became such a fine art that they could be expected to land right on an enemy's missile silos. Such a direct hit would destroy the silo and any missile in it. The ability to take out your opponent's missiles had a profound effect on the balance of power. But you could only expect to hit a silo if you knew exactly where you were launching from. That's not hard if your missiles are on land, as most of them were in the Soviet Union. But most of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was at sea on subs. To maintain the balance of power the U.S. had to come up with a way to allow those subs to surface and fix their exact position in a matter of minutes anywhere in the world.... Hello GPS! --- http://www.trimble.com/gps/why.html ....the U.S. Department of Defense decided that the military had to have a super precise form of worldwide positioning. And fortunately they had the kind of money ($12 billion!) it took to build something really good. The result is the Global Positioning System, a system that's changed navigation forever. _________________ NavSTAR could easily have been named "Deathstar". For anyone interested in a more detailed short history of GPS, here is a link that includes the Air Force nuclear strike efforts with their MOSAIC and 621B programs along with the Navy contributions: http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2002/01.html ~ CT [snip] > _________________ > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > ~ CT Well, that's what they *want* you to believe. In fact, the top brass in charge of these programs were avid fishermen. Despite all the technology available at the time, there was no way for them to positively return to that "sweet spot" on the lake. So...a hundred million here, a billion there...and you got yourself one of the best fishing navigation systems in the world. NavSTAR could easily have been named "FishSTAR". But they don't want you to know that. -stmx3 From stmx3: > [snip] > [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > > But they don't want you to know that. That was hilarious! Thanks for the laugh. Maybe the reason why my ribs are in stitches right now is because I can *actually* imagine that happening! ~ CT >But you could only expect to hit a silo if you knew exactly where you >were launching from. That's not hard if your missiles are on land, as [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >come up with a way to allow those subs to surface and fix their exact >position in a matter of minutes anywhere in the world.... Hello GPS! The problem with that is... We had no need of such a capability. What an SSBN needs is a method of knowing it's position *without* having to surface, or preferably even coming close to the surface. We already had that capability with SINS, SINS/ESGM, and with ESGN. From the point of view of an SSBN, GPS is 'nice-to-have', not 'must have'. GPS along with LORAN and some other things is used to calibrate the ships inertial navigators. Once the calibration is complete, we only need access for a few minutes to *one* of the multiple reference standards (GPS, LORAN, BQS-3) to ensure the calibration remained accurate. At one point the D-5 operational concept included both a GPS mast for obtaining the calibration update prelaunch and GPS systems in the missile itself. Both were dropped because they added very little to total system accuracy, though the capability to obtain discrete updates from GPS as a calibration aid were retained. >NavSTAR could easily have been named "Deathstar". > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > >http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2002/01.html That link is so wrong it's laughable. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. : The problem with that is... We had no need of such a capability. : What an SSBN needs is a method of knowing it's position *without* : having to surface, or preferably even coming close to the surface. We : already had that capability with SINS, SINS/ESGM, and with ESGN. : From the point of view of an SSBN, GPS is 'nice-to-have', not 'must : have'. I'm not certain I quite agree with that. The USN definitely needed such a capability. For starters, SSBNs launch from relatively close to the surface, and in launching advertise themselves very well, and are not supposed to be anywhere near an enemy when they do. Thus, coming close to or at the surface is not such a liability. This is particularly true if you are going to be using satcomms for any purpose - verification, mission update, etc. Secondly, the USN wanted to be able to use SSBN launched missiles in counterfire, not a a countervalue, role. You can nuke a city without too much accuracy, but if you want to plink hardened silos and buried targets accuracy becomes much more important. This is particularly true if you want to move to using MIRVs against silo fields, etc. In addition, during that time the USN was greatly improving its modeling databases and incorporating this knowledge into missile guidance (for example, more precise gravitational maps, etc.). To fully utilize such data and calculate its effects over the course of the launch it helped to have a much greater accuracy in launch locations and, eventually, with onboard GPS updating aboard the missile. A lot changed in the intervening years, but the USN was clearly looking at increasing submarine ballistic missile accuracies by orders of magnitude to allow new missions and employment models. If the USN wanted to improve it capabilities, it needed GPS or some suitable replacement. INS is great, and it has improved as well, but it was not expected to be able to match the accuracy of the GPS system or allow the kind of precision firing that the USN wanted. (There are continuing arguments over just how much accuracy is really efficient/needed - but the military back then was clearly of the opinion there could not be too much of it). regards, ---------------------------------------------- sjforsbe@bayou.uh.edu >: The problem with that is... We had no need of such a capability. >: What an SSBN needs is a method of knowing it's position *without* [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > I'm not certain I quite agree with that. You may do so. :) I'll refute as best I can without risking a vacation in Kansas. (Do keep in mind I did this stuff for a living.) >The USN definitely needed such a capability. For starters, SSBNs launch >from relatively close to the surface, and in launching advertise themselves >very well, and are not supposed to be anywhere near an enemy when they >do. Thus, coming close to or at the surface is not such a liability. SSBN's launch from considerably beneath periscope depth. Transiting to PD and back to launch depth not only increases the length of the launch process, but increases the 'something is up' signature. We won't launch if we know we are being shadowed, but for obvious reasons we always behave as if we are being shadowed and just don't know it. Thus coming close to the surface does the two things the USN has always avoided (and spent a great deal of money to avoid[1]); increasing the length of the launch sequence and increasing the launch signature. Thus coming to or close to the surface is a liability. [1] For example, modifying the valves used to pressurize the launch tubes in order to reduce the noise they generated. The pressurization and flow control valves in the hovering system were also modified for greater quietness because setting up that system as we made other launch preps was a noisy and very obvious signature. Across the history of the SSBN force reducing the indiscretion rate and reducing the length and signature of the launch process have been right behind accuracy (and not far behind at that) in the goals and requirements of the system. Thus LORAN capability was added to the bouy and wire (discussed below) and the BQS-3 secure fathometer developed to avoid surface exposure. We did/do have mast mounted antenna for Transit/GPS, but these are used as little as possible to avoid going near the surface. >This is particularly true if you are going to be using satcomms for any >purpose - verification, mission update, etc. We don't, not really. Satcomm is a backup for two other systems, one which allows us to patrol deep (the bouy) and another which allows us to patrol near (but not breaking as satcomm requires) the surface (the wire). Also, SSIXS is a store-and-forward system (which requires interrogation by the SSBN) rather than the continuous comms provided by the systems the surface fleet and the rest of the DoD uses. > Secondly, the USN wanted to be able to use SSBN launched missiles >in counterfire, not a a countervalue, role. You can nuke a city without too >much accuracy, but if you want to plink hardened silos and buried targets >accuracy becomes much more important. Certainly accuracy is important, but SSBN/SLBM system design also has to consider issues (outlined above) that an ICBM system does not. That was a prime driver behind the development of the ESGM/ESGN. Not only was it more accurate than SINS, but it also required fewer and less frequent (possibly detectable) external updates to maintain overall system accuracy. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. From Derek Lyons: > >: The problem with that is... We had no need of such a capability. > >: What an SSBN needs is a method of knowing it's position *without* [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > You may do so. :) I'll refute as best I can without risking a > vacation in Kansas. (Do keep in mind I did this stuff for a living.) People who did navigation for a living knew that GPS was so good that it was going to force thousands of them into unemployment. > >The USN definitely needed such a capability. For starters, SSBNs launch > >from relatively close to the surface, and in launching advertise themselves [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > won't launch if we know we are being shadowed, but for obvious reasons > we always behave as if we are being shadowed and just don't know it. (According to that statement, SSBNs would never launch.) > Thus coming close to the surface does the two things the USN has > always avoided (and spent a great deal of money to avoid[1]); [quoted text clipped - 25 lines] > interrogation by the SSBN) rather than the continuous comms provided > by the systems the surface fleet and the rest of the DoD uses. Note the strict definition of continuous comm here. ELF != broadband Imagine sub crews trying to surf the internet at a baud rate of 5. Thats "5" as in "5.0". Not 5.0k. Just plain five. Talk about comm brevity. Bubbleheads redefined the term. > > Secondly, the USN wanted to be able to use SSBN launched missiles > >in counterfire, not a a countervalue, role. You can nuke a city without too > >much accuracy, but if you want to plink hardened silos and buried targets > >accuracy becomes much more important. (Counter_force_ is the standard compliment to countervalue. I know that college profs have a way of inventing new terminology!) > Certainly accuracy is important, but SSBN/SLBM system design also has > to consider issues (outlined above) that an ICBM system does not. > That was a prime driver behind the development of the ESGM/ESGN. Not > only was it more accurate than SINS, but it also required fewer and > less frequent (possibly detectable) external updates to maintain > overall system accuracy. Here you are talking about late-90s technology. We were talking about satellite navigation, a concept as old as Sputnik[+]. Notice that the first Transit satellite was launched in *1959*. Notice also that the first sub-launched ballistic missile happened a mere three months after the first successful Transit satellite reached orbit. (One reference- http://www.redsword.com/GPS/old/sum_his.htm) I don't see this as a mere coincidence, Derek. Accurate navigation is a requirement for accurate missiles. Satellites provided that. [+] - An interesting story is how the concept of satellite navigation dates back to the early days of Sputnik. Folks at Johns Hopkins were able to work an orbit determination for Sputnik based on the doppler shift of its beeps. It was soon reasoned that just as measurements from a known ground location could be used to determine an unknown satellite's orbit, the converse applied as well. Measurements of a known satellite's orbit could be used to determine an unknown ground location. ~ CT From Derek Lyons: (quoted) > >But you could only expect to hit a silo if you knew exactly where you > >were launching from. That's not hard if your missiles are on land, as [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > From the point of view of an SSBN, GPS is 'nice-to-have', not 'must > have'. Derek, of course that is the grossly abbreviated version that they are relating. Knowing the more complete history of GPS, it's easy to infer that the folks at Trimble were referring to Transit as a precursor to GPS. Note that Transit was first launched a mere two and a half years after Sputnik. > GPS along with LORAN and some other things is used to calibrate the > ships inertial navigators. Once the calibration is complete, we only [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > very little to total system accuracy, though the capability to obtain > discrete updates from GPS as a calibration aid were retained. You could likewise argue that Air Force strategic bombers had no need for GPS because they had INS supplemented with TACAN and RADAR. But the fact is that many billions of dollars *were* spent. The problem was that INS was far from perfectly reliable. Acceleration errors accumulated in both air and sea navigation. This meant that warheads would land *off target*. There was a definite need to improve navigation. Notice that even today the space shuttle is involved with a GPS upgrade. For every flight to date it had multiple INS with multiple TACAN. If this was deemed reliable and accurate enough then the GPS conversion would be a complete waste of time and money. Now talk to the astronauts and see how badly the want GPS. The accuracy and reliability desired by astronauts today to reach their touchdown zone follows the accuracy and reliability that the Air Force and Navy wanted for their Triad back in the 60s when GPS concepts were being brewed. > >NavSTAR could easily have been named "Deathstar". > > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > That link is so wrong it's laughable. The Aerospace Corporation is one of the original players in GPS. I'm sure they'd appreciate having any errors pointed out to them. ~ CT >You could likewise argue that Air Force strategic bombers had no need >for GPS because they had INS supplemented with TACAN and RADAR. The behavior of the USAF across it's history supports that argument, they were a latecomer to GPS, not an early adopter. The bombers depended on radar and visual sightings once they entered the bombing run. One suspects their involvement was more attributeable to politics (increasing the accuracy of manned bombers increases their viability, and being involved in a program that was in space but not USAF controlled) as any desire for accuracy. >Notice that even today the space shuttle is involved with a GPS >upgrade. For every flight to date it had multiple INS with multiple >TACAN. If this was deemed reliable and accurate enough then the GPS >conversion would be a complete waste of time and money. > >Now talk to the astronauts and see how badly the want GPS. They want it because it's available. There was certainly no such clamor during the design phase. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. >>You could likewise argue that Air Force strategic bombers had no need >>for GPS because they had INS supplemented with TACAN and RADAR. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > viability, and being involved in a program that was in space but not > USAF controlled) as any desire for accuracy. The big military beneficiary of GPS was the Army. The biggest problem all commanders have had throughout history hasn't been finding the enemy, but ficuring out where you own troops are. Maps get misread, phase lines misreported, terrain features mis-identified, etc. Nowadays, it's possible for a GPS-equyipped army to have a single, undisuptable source for position information that isn't as susceptible to being flummoxed by teh ministrations of a 2nd Lt. The AIr Force's biggest problems, wrt GPS vs. on-board targeting systems, is that it's only useful for weapons direction if you actually know where the target is. Even today, most of the world's maps aren't usable. (Show me the Syrian/Iraqi border for example - it's never been properly surveyed, and you can't tell where it is, on the ground.) This doesn't even include stuff like teh deliberate disinformation that the Soviets engaged in, misstating the position of geographic features and significant facilities by a wide margin. (Yes, we're using GPS-aided weapons now. (Although INS is actually the primary, and the GPS system provides updates) But in those cases, either the target is spotted adn located by a nobserver who now, through GPS, knows their own position, and can thus provide a good location independant of the cartography, or teh target is spotted by systems on board the aircraft - the same sort of deal, now that the airplane can tell where it is.) SignaturePete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster > The AIr Force's biggest problems, wrt GPS vs. on-board targeting > systems, is that it's only useful for weapons direction if you [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > systems on board the aircraft - the same sort of deal, now that the > airplane can tell where it is.) And to bring this back to space, I believe the last Shuttle hi-res mapping mission had this as one of it's objectives. It's really really hard to get the full resolution data from the government. I remember an article about one of the research projects that benefitted was trying to map/model the Amazon. They finally had terrain data that predicted the Amazon would flow to the sea. Their former elevation data was too inaccurate. Does anyone remember TERCOM guidance for cruise missiles? The acronym stood for TERrain COMparision and tried to fit output from a mapping radar in the missile to a digital map, to figure out where it was. It sucked, but it was eventually brute-forced to work. This was because we didn't have any decent maps of the USSR. I'm sure they chucked that sucker as soon as GPS receivers dropped below 50 lbs. -gc SignatureI've noticed lately that the paranoid fear of computers becoming intelligent and taking over the world has almost entirely disappeared from the common culture. Near as I can tell, this coincides with the release of MS-DOS. -- Larry DeLuca : Does anyone remember TERCOM guidance for cruise missiles? The acronym stood : for TERrain COMparision and tried to fit output from a mapping radar in the : missile to a digital map, to figure out where it was. It sucked, but it was : eventually brute-forced to work. This was because we didn't have any decent We had very good maps of the USSR. Of course we had to make them ourselves. TERCOM wasn't bad, andindeed some of its descendants are still in use thuogh now they often find spots on targets and not just valleysand roads. regards, --------------------------- sjforsbe@bayou.uh.edu From Peter Stickney: > The big military beneficiary of GPS was the Army. The biggest problem > all commanders have had throughout history hasn't been finding the [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > undisuptable source for position information that isn't as susceptible > to being flummoxed by teh ministrations of a 2nd Lt. The "biggest problem" of land commanders was far surpassed by the primacy of nuclear weapons as the focal point of Cold War strategy and funding. US Army soldiers were non-players. I totally agree that the Army had the most beneficiaries. But as far as the justification for funding GPS, this third service experienced a total eclipse by the Air Force and Navy. Notice that DNSS was created from Air Force and Navy programs. This isn't to say that the Army didn't ask for their own separate program like the AF 621B or Navy's Timation. But it's not hard to imagine a scene where the Army chief of staff approaches the SecDef... Army: "Sir, we would like to have a multibillion dollar sat nav program so that my soldiers won't get lost in the field." SecDef: "I have REAL PROBLEMS I'm trying to solve." > The AIr Force's biggest problems, wrt GPS vs. on-board targeting > systems, is that it's only useful for weapons direction if you [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > disinformation that the Soviets engaged in, misstating the position of > geographic features and significant facilities by a wide margin. The vast majority of Cold War targets *had* known locations. (I'm not disagreeing with your point about mobile targets, its just that SIOP planners took this into account and so they pointed their warheads at places they knew would be vulnerable.) > (Yes, we're using GPS-aided weapons now. (Although INS is actually > the primary, and the GPS system provides updates) But in those cases, [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > systems on board the aircraft - the same sort of deal, now that the > airplane can tell where it is.) I don't know how you came to the conclusion that INS is primary. GPS directly gives position and velocity information. INS is totally useless without fixing a position. As far as aerospace applications are concerned, they work together as an integrated nav system. Things that fly move too fast for GPS alone to be much good. A little known fact is that even "GPS bombs" have their own miniaturized inertial systems built in. ...single use only, of course. As opposed to thinking of one as primary and the other as secondary, the industry treats them as an integrated _unit_. Even on the space shuttle, the system is known by the acronym "SIGI" (pronounced "siggy") which stands for Space Integrated GPS-INS. More info: http://content.honeywell.com/dses/products/sensors/launch/sigi.htm ~ CT B : Notice that DNSS was created from Air Force and Navy programs. This : isn't to say that the Army didn't ask for their own separate program : like the AF 621B or Navy's Timation. But it's not hard to imagine a : scene where the Army chief of staff approaches the SecDef... The Army did have its "own" system into the late 60s and early 70s, called SECOR. It was used extensively for geodetic survey and pre0surveying launch locations for army missiles. Like its contemporaries, it was not designed for "tactical" use like GPS. One thing to keep in mind about GPS is that it has worked so much better than most hoped for. With continuing advances in electronics manufacture and computers it has become possilbe to makerelatively cheap/reliable units for the smallest echelons. Originally there were doubts as to how practical it would be for aircraft, for example. Its tunred out to be a wonder. I There was a re-organization in the 60s that rationalized a lot of the space projects, expecially as there was increasing overlap between "black" NRO systems and 'mundane' DoD efforts. The Navy was put in charge of timekeeping and precision time interval technology, more or less, and GPS ended up being one facet of that. It was a traditional mission, the Navy had been keeping time since noon "dropping the ball" in DC in the 1850s. Just a tad bit more acccurate these days. :-) regards, --------------------------- sjforsbe@bayou.uh.edu From Steven James Forsberg: > : Notice that DNSS was created from Air Force and Navy programs. This > : isn't to say that the Army didn't ask for their own separate program [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > The Army did have its "own" system into the late 60s and > early 70s, called SECOR. I wasn't saying that the Army didn't have any sat-nav system. My comment was regarding *quality*. High performance nav systems require high dollar investment in research. A general statement about funding during the Cold War is that the Air Force and Navy got the lion's share. The Triad was... 2 x AF, 1 x Navy, 0 x Army. > It was used extensively for geodetic survey > and pre0surveying launch locations for army missiles. Like its [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > practical it would be for aircraft, for example. Its tunred out to be > a wonder. I Here's where that hypothetical scene comes in... We can guess that the Army wanted a system with performance specs along the lines of 621B/Timation, but research for this would require big bucks. Someone at OSD had to prioritize which services would get how much. And this required a judgement of projected return on each dollar of investment. With the Army having little control over nukes, they get little priority for funding. (This happened with *lots* more programs beside sat-nav.) > There was a re-organization in the 60s that rationalized a lot of > the space projects, expecially as there was increasing overlap between [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > had been keeping time since noon "dropping the ball" in DC in the 1850s. > Just a tad bit more acccurate these days. :-) No doubt about the accuracy of atomic clocks compared to sundials! But as far as how long the US Navy has been keeping time, I'd go back a lot earlier than the 1850s. And if you meant to say how long the _USNO_ has been keeping time, their official site states that their time-ball in DC started in 1845 (ref- http://www.usno.navy.mil/command_history.html). Well before the US Navy had a USNO, they kept time and communicated it. There's a long history of time being critical to ship navigation. While latitude can be directly measured, longitude measurements are a function of time. This is a necessary result of Earth rotation symmetry. While time-balls provided a visual synchronization for clocks, the older "technology" of bells communicated an aural synchronization. The word 'clock' came from the word that meant 'bell'. While the very word 'navigate' came from the same origin as the word 'Navy'. The Latin 'navis' simply means 'ship'. I'd say that the US Navy has been keeping time since the very first day of the US Navy. And the amazing story of pre-US Navy ship timekeeping focuses on that famous pre-Beatle Brit by the name of John Harrison. His chronometers were as big a revolution for navigation in the 1700s as GPS is for us today. (...although his 'Pi'-based musical scale theory has been slow in catching on! http://www.lucytune.com/academic/manuscript_search.html) ~ CT From Derek Lyons: > >You could likewise argue that Air Force strategic bombers had no need > >for GPS because they had INS supplemented with TACAN and RADAR. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > viability, and being involved in a program that was in space but not > USAF controlled) as any desire for accuracy. Perhaps I was not clear enough the first time. Derek, GPS was funded because: INS was neither accurate nor reliable. INS may be accurate after being fixed to a known location, but INS *does not measure position*. It does not even measure velocity. It measures acceleration. And that means that the slightest error gets integrated into a larger error in velocity, which gets integrated into an EVEN LARGER error in position. Over short periods of time, INS accelerometers were well known for running the position away with a skewed platform. Bomber missions take several hours and there are long stretches of time between fixes where INS's often behave badly. It took diligence of a highly skilled navigator to keep the INS "corralled", so to speak, by regularly pumping good fixes into the system. ...and *even then* it was known to go inaccurate. Aside from errors within the INS itself, even highly skilled navigators would make errors in identifying radar targets to fix off of (there were lots of other sources of error as well). The optimal solution was to measure position directly, instead of integrating all those errors. The Air Force was in on the *ground floor* for the DNSS (renamed GPS), so I don't know why anyone would say that they were latecomers. The Navy had a 2-D system that worked at extremely low velocity. Jets can't stop like subs can. And jets need 3-D position. It *was* the Air Force who created such a system. The most significant GPS contribution from the Navy was the atomic clocks. The basics of the signal theory came from the Air Force. As derived from MOSAIC, it was the technology that was designed for positioning ICBM launches that gave us the system we use today. Air Force technology. > >Notice that even today the space shuttle is involved with a GPS > >upgrade. For every flight to date it had multiple INS with multiple [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > They want it because it's available. There was certainly no such > clamor during the design phase. While the shuttle is capable of doing automatic navigation fixes from TACAN stations, it still suffers the accuracy problems inherent in INS systems that don't get precise position updates. Part of astronaut pilot training is practicing landings with *bad nav*. This is why they want GPS. They don't like the idea of their nav system taking them down to a spot that is so far off the runway that they crash. The primary issue isn't convenience. It isn't technology fashion trends. It's a matter of living, versus not. The reason why there was no "clamor during the design phase" was because there was no GPS when shuttle was designed. It was just a theory. ~ CT From Steve Hix: > > From Ami Silberman: > > > > From Steve Hix: [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > They're just *very* long-range artillery. Not space-based currently, > either. Notice who operates all US ICBMs: Air Force Space Command. That Fact Sheet that was presented earlier (http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=155&page=1) explains ICBMs as offensive space weaponry. > > > > and GPS as providing offensive weaponry capability. > [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > Try again. (See next try at news:<d3af8584.0406170555.1af44364@posting.google.com>) ~ CT > From Steve Hix: > > > From Ami Silberman: [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > > Air Force Space Command. Under the actual operational joint command of STRATCOM. > > From Ami Silberman: > > > > From Steve Hix: [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > They're just *very* long-range artillery. Not space-based currently, > either. The Soviets also considered ICBMs to be long-range artillery. > > > > and GPS as providing offensive weaponry capability. Pure baloney, any way you slice it. Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, long before GPS ever existed. > Among *thousands* of other uses. > > You might as well class penicillin, ambulances, packaged food as > offensive weapons. Also include computers, calculators, and microelectronics that makes modern satellites feasible. :-] From Scott Kozel: > > > From Ami Silberman: > > > > > From Steve Hix: [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the > Iron Curtain, long before GPS ever existed. I don't see how those facts refute anything I've stated. ~ CT > From Scott Kozel: > > > > From Ami Silberman: [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > > I don't see how those facts refute anything I've stated. GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. In sci.space.policy Scott M. Kozel <kozelsm@attbi.com> wrote: > GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that > it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. Fine. And I doubt many people would argue against that. But surely you don't want to claim that specificly military tailored and military controlled navigation satellites used in weapons targeting are part not of space militarisation? SignatureSander +++ Out of cheese error +++ > > GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that > > it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > controlled navigation satellites used in weapons targeting are part > not of space militarisation? I just got done refuting that notion. GPS has many civil uses, and is no more "space militarisation" than is things like computers, calculators, and microelectronics that makes modern satellites feasible, plus weather satellites and other communication satellites. Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, decades before GPS ever existed. In sci.space.policy Scott M. Kozel <kozelsm@attbi.com> wrote: > > > GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that > > > it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > calculators, and microelectronics that makes modern satellites feasible, > plus weather satellites and other communication satellites. This is simply nonsense. When was the last time you saw a receiver on sale that could actually make use of all GPS? GPS is not in any way comparable to computers or modern electronics. It is not even designed for civilian use, you may as well claim military cargo planes are not military aircraft at all. In fact, if you go by US laws, any placement of satellites in orbit at all is space militarisation due to classification of satellites and satellite technology as munitions > Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the > Iron Curtain, decades before GPS ever existed. Which is utterly irrelevant to whetever GPS is space militarisation or not. SignatureSander +++ Out of cheese error +++ > > > > GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that > > > > it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > for civilian use, you may as well claim military cargo planes are not > military aircraft at all. You're the one who is posting nonsense. Obviously you've never seen the commercially available receivers that instantly provide the exact coordinates of a location to within a few feet. That has valuable civil navigational uses. > In fact, if you go by US laws, any placement of satellites in orbit at > all is space militarisation due to classification of satellites and > satellite technology as munitions Complete, utter nonsense. > > Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the > > Iron Curtain, decades before GPS ever existed. > > Which is utterly irrelevant to whetever GPS is space militarisation > or not. It is totally relevant, since those ICBMs and SLBMs can be (and were) very accurate without GPS. You're just looking for any far-fetched excuse possible to attack the U.S. From Scott Kozel: > > > > > GPS is not "offensive space-based weaponry", and for you to assert that > > > > > it is, shows you have an agenda to post disinformation about the topic. [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] > coordinates of a location to within a few feet. That has valuable civil > navigational uses. I totally agree that GPS has many civil uses. You can say the same thing about the internet. But that does nothing to change the history of the origins of either system stemming from nuclear warfare. Here is a fact that: "it is commonly known that civil users outnumber military users by 100 to 1 and the ratio is increasing". Along with internet use, the civil/military user ratio for interstate highways is way up there too. But the fact remains that the funding for many infrastrucure elements that we take for granted today came as a direct result of nuclear warfare strategy. > > > Accurate ICBMs and SLBMs existed by the thousands, on both sides of the > > > Iron Curtain, decades before GPS ever existed. [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > It is totally relevant, since those ICBMs and SLBMs can be (and were) > very accurate without GPS. Inertial navigation systems are (and were) notoriously lacking in reliability. This translates to a lack of reliable accuracy in the nuclear triad (bombers being far more susceptible than ICBMs to INS inaccuracies since acceleration errors build over time). And this translates to a decrease in deterrent effect. GPS was essentially funded as a force multiplier that helped tip the balance of power in the favor of the US. > You're just looking for any far-fetched excuse possible to attack the > U.S. I don't speak for Sander, but I hope you don't see my efforts as an _attack_ against the US. As I've stated elsewhere, offering criticism toward the US does not necessarily make someone anti-US. Every country has its faults. Patriotic nationalism can have a negative effect of *hiding* those faults (note that Nazi is a contraction of a German word for nationalist). My definition of patriot includes working to identify and fix critical faults. ~ CT > From Scott Kozel: > [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > thing about the internet. But that does nothing to change the history > of the origins of either system stemming from nuclear warfare. The initial projected uses of them were far more diverse than things related to nuclear warfare. > Here is a fact that: > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > for many infrastrucure elements that we take for granted today came as > a direct result of nuclear warfare strategy. You've mentioned Interstate highways several times now, and highway administration happens to have been my profession for 30 years, so let's set the record straight with respect to Interstate highways. The Interstate highway system was first approved in plan in 1943 (before nuclear weapons existed), and in actual construction beginning in 1956, and the federal funding mechanism was 90% federal funds from the Highway Trust Fund which was stocked with the receipts of direct road user tax revenues. The Interstate highway system never got funding from the U.S. Defense Department, and the prime impetus for beginning the system was to provide more capacity for the burgeoning civilian traffic in the nation, and the "and defense" in the system name "National System of Interstate and Defense Highways" was tacked on by politicians who wanted to add weight to getting the 1956 Highway Act passed; but the IHS always was intended primarily for handling civilian traffic. About 3,000 miles of state-built (with no federal funds) turnpikes predated the Interstate highway system, and they were built for the same basic reasons as the Interstates, to the same basic superhighway design standards, so the concept and need for such superhighways was well established before the Interstate highway system was started; in fact, much of that turnpike mileage was later incorporated into the Interstate highway system, route-wise. This aside on highways is instructive, because it highlights how misconceptions can arise about the origins of things. > > It is totally relevant, since those ICBMs and SLBMs can be (and were) > > very accurate without GPS. [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > inaccuracies since acceleration errors build over time). And this > translates to a decrease in deterrent effect. Still, GPS did not provide any new unique capability, and all 3 legs of the U.S. nuclear triad were quite accurate in their own right prior to GPS. > GPS was essentially funded as a force multiplier that helped tip the > balance of power in the favor of the US. That claim could be made about many things, such as better computers, better radios, more education for military personnel, better C-rations for soldiers, etc., etc. SignatureScott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com |
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