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Space Forum / Space History / March 2004$64 Billion and seventeen years to land on the moon. What's wrong with this picture?
This week's AW&ST: "Pressed by Congress for cost estimates on Bush's Moon/Mars exploration plan, NASA releases some figures to back up its pretty but imprecise "sand chart" that purports to demonstrate there's no hidden cost "balloon" in the plan (AW&ST Jan. 26, p. 22). According to the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service, NASA assumes it will cost $64 billion in Fiscal 2003 dollars to land humans on the Moon in 2020. That amount includes $24 billion to build and operate the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) through 2020, plus $40 billion in Fiscal 2011-20 to build and operate a CEV lunar lander. " > This week's AW&ST: > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) through 2020, plus $40 > billion in Fiscal 2011-20 to build and operate a CEV lunar lander. " That's about two-thirds the cost of Apollo, in current dollars. That sounds about right, considering that 1) we've done it before, but 2) everyone who did it the first time is retired or dead. What did *you* find wrong with the picture?  SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >> This week's AW&ST: >> [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > >What did *you* find wrong with the picture? Seventeen years. >>> This week's AW&ST: >>> [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > > Seventeen years. There's two possible responses to this: 1) The actual date for the first lunar return in the plan was a range between 2015-2020, and CRS automatically picked the most pessimistic. It could happen sooner. 2) Even if it is 2020, why hurry? The artificial deadline placed on Apollo helped force some design decisions that ensured that the program would be too expensive to sustain. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. [snip] > 2) Even if it is 2020, why hurry? The artificial deadline placed on Apollo > helped force some design decisions that ensured that the program would be > too expensive to sustain. That's a very good point. In many ways Apollo was a victim of its own success. Signaturebp Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003 (replace ".dot." in email address with ".") > [snip] > [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > That's a very good point. In many ways Apollo was a victim of its own > success. And it also forced a number of parallel paths to be executed as technical risk mitigation. Doable, but that's when you have money to burn but not time. On the other hand, first unmanned, automated test flight of the CEV is in 2008. Signaturerk, Just an OldEngineer "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled." -- R. Feynman, Appendix F. >> 2) Even if it is 2020, why hurry? The artificial deadline placed on Apollo > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >That's a very good point. In many ways Apollo was a victim of its own >success. I often wonder what capability we would of been left with if Apollo had first built a station and other von braun ideas from the beginning? >>> 2) Even if it is 2020, why hurry? The artificial deadline placed on Apollo >> [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] >I often wonder what capability we would of been left with if Apollo had first >built a station and other von braun ideas from the beginning? Another interesting "what if" is if they'd done as they'd originally planned and gradually got into orbit with winged vehicles instead of getting ballistic missiles and capsule forced on them to get into space as soon as possible. They might not have got into orbit as soon but when they did they'd have likely have been more versitile. >>>> This week's AW&ST: >>>> [quoted text clipped - 26 lines] >helped force some design decisions that ensured that the program would be >too expensive to sustain. The idea isn't so much to hurry but to not waste time. Look at any military procurement effort and you'll see that the longer you stretch it out the more costs skyrocket. There isn't really any new technology to develope so why stretch it out when you don't need to? So you can develope an engine that gets two more Isp and costs five times as much? I probably sound like a broken record (for those who remember records LOL) but until they bring launch costs down substantially, nothing significant is going to be affordable. If they were serious about going to the moon and mars the first order of business would be funding the developement of a CHEAP way to get pounds into orbit. As it is, it just looks like more vaporware for political purposes. Scott Ferrin <sferrin@xmission.com> wrote... <snip> > If they > were serious about going to the moon and mars the first > order of business would be funding the development of > a CHEAP way to get pounds into orbit. As it is, it just > looks like more vaporware for political purposes. I think developing 'cheap' access to space would be way down on the priority list. Maybe a little cheaper, but if its too cheap that would risk the possibility of space supremacy slipping from the US. China, without the millstones of congress and public opinion, might run with 'cheap pounds to orbit' faster than we expect. - Peter > I think developing 'cheap' access to space would be way down on the priority > list. Maybe a little cheaper, but if its too cheap that would risk the > possibility of space supremacy slipping from the US. China, without the > millstones of congress and public opinion, might run with 'cheap pounds to > orbit' faster than we expect. OK, so if the USA wants to win the ensuing second space race, we'll have to follow the script. We already have had the president setting a goal. Now have to assassinate him or people will lose interest. Grassy Noel >> I think developing 'cheap' access to space would be way down on the >> priority [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Grassy Noel Oh, for humour, massive bravo ! I'm laughing and applauding as I type this ( Not from a " Kill George " POV, but just from the theme of redoing the 60s... ). Andre -- " I'm a man... But, I can change... If I have to... I guess. " The Man Prayer, Red Green. > Oh, for humour, massive bravo ! I'm laughing and applauding as > I type this ( Not from a " Kill George " POV, but just from the > theme of redoing the 60s... ). Christ. Cheney wins in a landslide, runs the country in a very disturibing Texan manner for four years, decides to step down and not run, Gore comes back from the dead, triumphs, then a landslide in '12, terrible scandal breaks, and... dear Lord, I don't want to imagine a future Democratic Gerald Ford. Signature-Andrew Gray shimgray@bigfoot.com >Christ. Cheney wins in a landslide, runs the country in a very >disturibing Texan manner for four years, decides to step down and not >run, Gore comes back from the dead, triumphs, then a landslide in '12, >terrible scandal breaks, and... dear Lord, I don't want to imagine a >future Democratic Gerald Ford. Imagine a Republican Jimmy Carter sometime....that's a scary one. Pat >>Christ. Cheney wins in a landslide, runs the country in a very >>disturibing Texan manner for four years, decides to step down and not [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > >Pat Wouldn't that be like trying to combine matter and antimatter? >>Imagine a Republican Jimmy Carter sometime....that's a scary one. >> >>Pat >> > >Wouldn't that be like trying to combine matter and antimatter? Would it have lust in its heart....for tax cuts on the wealthy? Pat >>Christ. Cheney wins in a landslide, runs the country in a very >>disturibing Texan manner for four years, decides to step down and not [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > Imagine a Republican Jimmy Carter sometime....that's a scary one. Well, let's see... It couldn't be Warren Gameliel Harding - He was the Republican's Bill Clinton. Calvin Coolidge, perhaps? Or maybe even better, Herbert Hoover. SignaturePete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster [...] > Well, let's see... It couldn't be Warren Gameliel Harding - He was the > Republican's Bill Clinton. Not quite -- Harding appears never to have made a decision about policy (just girls and consumables), and it appearently wasn't even his idea to run. /dps >I think developing 'cheap' access to space would be way down on the priority >list. Maybe a little cheaper, but if its too cheap that would risk the [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > >- Peter Well then lets see China develop a low cost to orbit system, or any other country. The US will have to catch up or be left behind >Scott Ferrin <sferrin@xmission.com> wrote... > [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] >list. Maybe a little cheaper, but if its too cheap that would risk the >possibility of space supremacy slipping from the US. Where is it written that "supremacy" rests on expensive launchers? Is one launcher superior to another that can launch five or ten times the payload for the same price just because it's engine has a higher ISP and the airframe is made of expensive materials? The superior rocket is the one that does the best job (hauling pounds to orbit) for the least cost. Right now we're doing the equivalent of delivering UPS packages in Ferraris. Yeah we got the best damn delivery vehicles on the face of the earth but it's ludicrous from a business standpoint. [...] > Where is it written that "supremacy" rests on expensive launchers? > Is one launcher superior to another that can launch five or ten times [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > on the face of the earth but it's ludicrous from a business > standpoint. Thus allowing it to be tightly controlled. And if the Chinese can launch too cheaply, they can put up more stuff that the US DOD has to worry about (or DoCommerce, as the case might be), so the US gov is rooting for the Chinese program to be expensive :-{ /dps Not to mention that the deadline that was imposed on Apollo forced a "whatever the cost" attitude to make the date. GO FEVER! > Not to mention that the deadline that was imposed on Apollo forced a > "whatever the cost" attitude to make the date. And yet, the American manned space program through the 1960s had to deal with any number of budgetary constraints, well before Apollo started flying. For example, the famous Gemini 7/6 rendezvous flight happened not because it was impossible to move a new Agena up into readiness for use by Gemini VI after its original Agena failed to achieve orbit. It happened because the Gemini program was given only so much money for procurement of Agena target vehicles, and they had no money to just get another one. Had they used another of the Agena vehicles that were being prepared, one of the later flights would have had to fly without one. Heck -- when the Gemini IX Agena failed to reach orbit, NASA used an Atlas booster that was scheduled for the Lunar Orbiter program (IIRC) to loft the ATDA that was used for the modified Gemini IX-A flight. That was one of the reasons why NASA decided against flying the backup Lunar Orbiter vehicle as LO6; they would have had to procure another Atlas to boost it, and the money wasn't there. So, it's a bit of a misconception to think that Apollo could just ask for whatever it wanted and someone would just open up the vault doors and load up another few hundred trucks of money. Yes, it was a *little* easier to get money back in 1964 and 1965, but not a *lot* easier. There were still a lot of limits imposed by budgetary restrictions. Doug dvandorn@NOSPAM.mn.rr.com >So, it's a bit of a misconception to think that Apollo could just ask >for whatever it wanted and someone would just open up the vault doors >and load up another few hundred trucks of money. A questionable conclusion since none of the examples of budgetary problems you provide deal with Apollo. Instead, they deal with a program that was a bit of a sideline - Gemini. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. > Even if it is 2020, why hurry? The artificial deadline placed on Apollo >helped force some design decisions that ensured that the program would be >too expensive to sustain. Good point. And although I am not big on what-ifs, I read an article some years ago saying that if EOR had been used instead of LOR, we would have more of an infrastructure in Earth orbit as a result. Even so, why take so long to develop Constellation that NASA has to figure out how to buy Soyuzes in the interim? I don't recall Apollo's development taking that long, even accounting for the fact that the vehicle was originally proposed before Mercury even flew. > Even so, why take so long to develop Constellation that NASA has to > figure out how to buy Soyuzes in the interim? I don't recall Apollo's > development taking that long, even accounting for the fact that the > vehicle was originally proposed before Mercury even flew. Apollo had piles of money to spend. A better yardstick would be the shuttle development program. The CEV program is at the very early concept stage. In the shuttle program, this would correspond to a period when the configuration of the vehicle was very much in flux (they weren't close to a "design"). Space shuttle design studies were being done in early 1969. The SSME was on the test stand as early as 1970. STS-1 didn't fly until 1981. Not having a CEV test flight until 2014 isn't unreasonable when you consider how long it took the shuttle to get to STS-1 (it's first orbital test flight, complete with two astronauts in full pressure suits and e-seats). Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >> Even so, why take so long to develop Constellation that NASA has to >> figure out how to buy Soyuzes in the interim? I don't recall Apollo's >> development taking that long... > >Apollo had piles of money to spend. Yes, but stretched programs cost *more*, not less. There is an optimum. The way to minimize costs is to take all necessary time to resolve major technical uncertainties, deferring flight hardware construction until that is finished... but once it is, go full speed ahead and start building and testing definitive hardware as soon as possible. The idea of flying a Block I as soon as possible and then taking half a decade to finish development of the definitive version is a recipe for waste. One of the major lessons that came out of Apollo's post-fire reassessment was to avoid, if at all possible, putting major engineering effort into something that isn't the final product. Apollo's Block I/II split was simply a mistake. SignatureMOST launched 30 June; science observations running | Henry Spencer since Oct; first surprises seen; papers pending. | henry@spsystems.net >Even so, why take so long to develop Constellation that NASA has to >figure out how to buy Soyuzes in the interim? I don't recall Apollo's >development taking that long, even accounting for the fact that the >vehicle was originally proposed before Mercury even flew. Wasn't Apollo first commissioned in 1959? So the crash program took eight years to get close to flyability (Apollo 1 *might* well have launched, after all) and nine to be workable. Given this, a 2004 to a 2014 schedule for manned flights ... isn't that far off. SignatureJoseph Nebus ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Wasn't Apollo first commissioned in 1959? So the crash program > took eight years to get close to flyability (Apollo 1 *might* well have > launched, after all) and nine to be workable. Given this, a 2004 to a > 2014 schedule for manned flights ... isn't that far off. No; people inside NASA had started to talk about a follow-on to Mercury in 1960, and asked industry to do some preliminary studies, but there was no serious government funding until after Kennedy's inauguration. NASA had a draft plan for a lunar landing proposal in January 1961, and design work on Apollo started that year; the various proposals are on http://www.astronautix.com (you could also look there for Project Horizon, a late-Fifties military plan for a lunar landing, and I think there was Project Lunex as well; one of these gave rise to the designs for the F-1, J-2 and RL-10 engines, which pushes some of the roots of Apollo/Saturn back to 1957). I'm not sure just when the North American CSM design was selected; I think it was early to mid-1962. The first unmanned Apollo CSM flight on a Saturn 1B was the Apollo 009 suborbital launch in February 1966. Given a February 1967 launch for Apollo 1, that would have been a bit less than five years after the general design was selected. NASA's early estimates for Apollo flights were optimistic; I recall public announcements that the first manned flight might come as early as 1965. --Bill Thompson (snip) > That's about two-thirds the cost of Apollo, in current dollars. That sounds > about right, considering that 1) we've done it before, but 2) everyone who > did it the first time is retired or dead. > What did *you* find wrong with the picture? I couldn't find the AW&ST report online, but I did find this summary of the budget: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1070930/posts There's no mention of funds for booster development--either man-rating a current booster, or developing a new booster in case the CEV and lunar vehicles can't fit current boosters. The timeline for developing the unmanned, Block I CEV alone seems amazingly rapid, especially as there are no plans available for it and its mission requirements. The schedule also seems to assume nothing will go wrong on this limited budget. In addition some funds will be taken from next-generation booster development. --Bill Thompson > > (snip) [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] > addition some funds will be taken from next-generation booster > development. This is what I read: For cargo transport to the Space Station after 2010, NASA will rely on existing or new commercial cargo transport systems, as well as international partner cargo transport systems. NASA does not plan to develop new launch vehicle capabilities except where critical NASA needs -such as heavy lift- are not met by commercial or military systems. Depending on future human mission designs, NASA could decide to develop or acquire a heavy lift vehicle later this decade. Such a vehicle could be derived from elements of the Space Shuttle, existing commercial launch vehicles, or new designs. Signaturerk, Just an OldEngineer "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled." -- R. Feynman, Appendix F. > There's no mention of funds for booster development--either man-rating > a current booster, or developing a new booster in case the CEV and lunar > vehicles can't fit current boosters. This time around, NASA doesn't have to spend so much on boosters. Years of shuttle investment provide an existing heavy-lift infrastructure. NASA's estimate for Shuttle-C development would amount to about $3 billion today - a minor fraction of the total program cost for a lunar program. EELV, thanks to the U.S. Air Force, is pretty much ready to go for CEV/LEO missions. - Ed Kyle >This time around, NASA doesn't have to spend so much on >boosters. Years of shuttle investment provide an existing [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > - Ed Kyle Well shuttle C MIGHT be cheap to develop but how about operate? Take the shuttle for instance. Its fully developed but cost way too much to operate. Will shuttle C be a impriovenment or a fiancial drag? > >This time around, NASA doesn't have to spend so much on > >boosters. Years of shuttle investment provide an existing [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > shuttle for instance. Its fully developed but cost way too much to operate. > Will shuttle C be a impriovenment or a fiancial drag? Recent annual shuttle budgets were in the $3.2 billion range. A steady shuttle-derived heavy lift (SDV) program, free of the labor-intensive orbiter processing requirements, could cost 2/3rds as much. At four launches per year, each launch, capable of putting roughly three EELV-Heavy equivalents (75 metric tons) in LEO, would cost roughly $533 million - probably putting it below the recently increased price point per kg of EELV-Heavy. More importantly, an SDV would simplify lunar mission planning by reducing the number and coordination of required launches - helping reduce the cost of spacecraft and mission payloads. - Ed Kyle >Recent annual shuttle budgets were in the $3.2 billion range. >A steady shuttle-derived heavy lift (SDV) program, free of [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > - Ed Kyle Can nasa manage to keep the cost down that much? If so it sounds fine by me. Now before someone else asks how about keeping a servicable shuttle around for specific jobs and flying it unmanned? Gut most of the man needed capacity and totally automate it. Gutting would boost the weight capacity and we could still have the ability to retuirn large payloads if thats even needed? > Now before someone else asks how about keeping a servicable shuttle around for > specific jobs and flying it unmanned? Gut most of the man needed capacity and > totally automate it. > > Gutting would boost the weight capacity and we could still have the ability to > retuirn large payloads if thats even needed? You'll have to spend development money to make it unmanned. The cost of this should be spread out over all unmanned flights to get the per flight cost. It also makes flying the shuttle more risky. There are many emergency procedures on the shuttle that require people on-board. Not the least of which is the contingency EVA for closing the payload bay doors (if they don't close automatically). Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >It also makes flying the shuttle more risky. There are many >emergency procedures on the shuttle that require people on-board. Not >the least of which is the contingency EVA for closing the payload bay >doors (if they don't close automatically). > >Jeff In the case of anything that needs done before reentry just leave the vehicle in orbit till a manned crew can do a repair mission. We might loose a vehicle because no one onboard but no one dies, a definite positive. I just wonder what changes might be made to the remaining shuttles to keep them operating for specific jobs in a unmanned mode. Specifically if shuttle C became a reality. > In the case of anything that needs done before reentry just leave the vehicle > in orbit till a manned crew can do a repair mission. This may be possible for some failures, but the failure of the payload bay doors to close is a sticky issue. The best way to fix this is to have someone in an EMU, in the payload bay, crank the doors closed. Now you've got someone in an EMU you have to get down on your unmanned shuttle. At this point, you've started down a slippery slope. You might as well stick a commander and pilot in the shuttle to fly down, since they increase the reliability of the vehicle and increase the safety to the crewman who's (in the worst case scenario) stuck riding in the back of the payload bay. > We might loose a vehicle because no one onboard but no one dies, a definite > positive. Not so. We've only got three vehicles left. Planning on flying them unmanned increases the risk you'll lose one. You believe that losing an orbiter will end the program. I believe that if this is the case, it won't make a difference if the shuttle is unmanned. The program will end due to lack of available orbiters to fly the required missions. > I just wonder what changes might be made to the remaining shuttles to keep them > operating for specific jobs in a unmanned mode. Specifically if shuttle C > became a reality. If Shuttle C becomes reality, there isn't much of a reason to ever fly a shuttle again. It's upmass would be far less than Shuttle C, and there isn't a real requirement for downmanss, outside of returning lunar/martain samples and astronauts. Shuttle C (or any other SDV) means the orbiters would go to museums. The biggest reason you must retire the orbiters is to free up funds to fly the SDV. NASA can't have its cake and eat it too. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >y be possible for some failures, but the failure of the payload >bay doors to close is a sticky issue. The best way to fix this is to >have someone in an EMU, in the payload bay, crank the doors closed. >Now you've got someone in an EMU you have to get dow Ahh he enters the old crew cabin and leaves out the airlock to his docked or nearby vehicle. No reason for him to remain in the shuttle for landing. >Not so. We've only got three vehicles left. Planning on flying them >unmanned increases the risk you'll lose one. You believe that losing [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > >Jeff Loosing a unmanned orbiter wouldnt end the program. Its that sticky issue of human death that can end it. You believe having it manned increases its safety margins. Just how many times did having a pilot at the controls save a orbiter? Telepresence with the pilot safe on the ground and triple redundant remote controls could likely accomplish the same thing. >>y be possible for some failures, but the failure of the payload >>bay doors to close is a sticky issue. The best way to fix this is to [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >Ahh he enters the old crew cabin and leaves out the airlock to his docked or >nearby vehicle. No reason for him to remain in the shuttle for landing. Ahh... Once he closes the doors they have only a very short window before they *must* do a de-orbit burn, or re-open the doors. It's odd how you are willing to accept extreme danger to save an unmanned craft, yet you won't accept any risk to fly a manned mission. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. >Ahh... Once he closes the doors they have only a very short window >before they *must* do a de-orbit burn, or re-open the doors. > >It's odd how you are willing to accept extreme danger to save an Ahh without all the people and support equitement for human habitation the amount of excess heat generated should be less extending the close door must deorbit now window. A vehicle to vehicle crew transfer to close the doors shouldnt be much riskier than a repair mission assuming the crew launch vehicle has launch escape. I believe such a mission would be safer. >>Ahh... Once he closes the doors they have only a very short window >>before they *must* do a de-orbit burn, or re-open the doors. [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >amount of excess heat generated should be less extending the close door must >deorbit now window. Ahh... Quite unlikely as there is no convection to carry the heat away from the electronics. They'll still get hot whether their is people onboard or not. >A vehicle to vehicle crew transfer to close the doors shouldnt be much riskier >than a repair mission assuming the crew launch vehicle has launch escape. I >believe such a mission would be safer. Once again your belief is based on the view you get from your colon. D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. >>>Ahh... Once he closes the doors they have only a very short window >>>before they *must* do a de-orbit burn, or re-open the doors. [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > Once again your belief is based on the view you get from your colon. Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. Grasp the subtleties, hallerb will not, I predict. :-( SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. >Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. > >Grasp the subtleties, hallerb will not, I predict. :-( ...If Jorge's gonna go all Yoda on us, I'm going to start doing Stanley Unwin :-P OM Signature"No bastard ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms poor dumb bastard die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society - General George S. Patton, Jr >Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. > >Grasp the subtleties, hallerb will not, I predict. :-( Too many re-runs of The Empire Strikes Back you have seen. <G> D. SignatureTouch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. >>Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. >> [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > <G> When September 21, 2004 arrives, watch these films again and again in glorious anamorphic widescreen and DD 5.1 through my 600 watt home theater system, I will. ;-) SignatureHerb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer Remove invalid nonsense for email. > When September 21, 2004 arrives, watch these films again and again in > glorious anamorphic widescreen and DD 5.1 through my 600 watt home theater > system, I will. ;-) Wow, I haven't been following the new DVD release schedule that carefully. This is the first I've heard of the release, and it's apparently true: http://www.starwars.com/episode-iv/news/2004/02/news20040210.html Now Episodes IV-VI will join I and II, along with George Lucas in Love, and the conversion of my Star Wars collection to the DVD side will be (nearly) complete! >Now Episodes IV-VI will join I and II, along with George Lucas in Love, >and the conversion of my Star Wars collection to the DVD side will be >(nearly) complete! Three good movies and two crappy ones have you will then....yes.... Yoda > Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. > > Grasp the subtleties, hallerb will not, I predict. :-( Yoda you are not. Yoda I know, and he you are not. SignatureThis is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | Just because something It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | is possible, doesn't No person, none, care | and it will reach me | mean it can happen > > Schooled hallerb thoroughly, you and Jeff have. > > > > Grasp the subtleties, hallerb will not, I predict. :-( > > Yoda you are not. Yoda I know, and he you are not. A friend of mine, Yoda was... Doug dvandorn@NOSPAM.mn.rr.com >Once again your belief is based on the view you get from your colon. ...Derek, I'd be careful. Word has it that Bob's been using his hemorrhoids as punching bags, and has developed a mean left hook to go with his right w.nk. OM Signature"No bastard ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms poor dumb bastard die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society - General George S. Patton, Jr > >y be possible for some failures, but the failure of the payload > >bay doors to close is a sticky issue. The best way to fix this is to [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Ahh he enters the old crew cabin and leaves out the airlock to his docked or > nearby vehicle. No reason for him to remain in the shuttle for landing. If it were docked to something, it would be through the APAS docking port in the payload bay. Kind of hard to exit there with the doors closed. I suppose he could exit through the side hatch, but this assumes you can depressurize the former crew cabin (you can't today because the electronics are air cooled), or that you added a new (heavy) airlock to the side of the crew cabin, which would be silly since one of the goals of making it unmanned would be to increase payload capacity. In the end, you'd have to add complex, expensive, and heavy modifications to the orbiter to insure you can get it back when flown unmanned. This will negate any "savings" to be had by flying it unmanned. > >Not so. We've only got three vehicles left. Planning on flying them > >unmanned increases the risk you'll lose one. You believe that losing [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] > Loosing a unmanned orbiter wouldnt end the program. Its that sticky issue of > human death that can end it. Only in your strange, twisted world. One more accident leaves only two orbiters. It becomes very hard to run a sane program at that point. With only two orbiters left, it would be hard to keep them both in flying condition (when do you schedule the periodic, months long, maintenance periods?). Because of this, I don't think it really makes any sense to plan on using these three orbiters in an operational way after the manned shuttle program ends. Flying them unmanned is expensive and/or risky, depending on how many "upgrades" you think you can afford. Lose just one of these three orbiters, and it becomes very hard to run the program from that point forward. > You believe having it manned increases its safety margins. Without a doubt. It's a historically proven fact. All you have to do is look at the failures on shuttle missions that were dealt with by the crew that could not be dealt with from the ground. > Just how many times did having a pilot at the controls save a orbiter? It would take a bit of research to get this info, but it's easy to think of a few. The issues with the initial flight control software on landing would likely have caused STS-1 to be a "loss of orbiter" had there not been a crew on board to take over "manual control". This has been discussed here by Mary, who co-wrote a technical paper on the matter. Then there was the flight where the crew had to "inhibit" the temperature sensors on the SSME's after one shut itself down after the temperature went past the "red line". I believe that was STS-51F. I'm sure there are others, besides these two. > Telepresence with the pilot safe on the ground and triple redundant remote > controls could likely accomplish the same thing. You seriously overestimate the ability to remotely pilot a vehicle. Look at the string of UAV failures in the Air Force history. It's *not* pretty. This is something the USAF has wanted to perfect for decades and has spent billions trying to do so. At best, they've been getting "close" for decades. At worst, they're still relying on flying manned missions that "could" be done unmanned. Every such flight puts its crew "at risk" in much the same way a shuttle flight does. Yet the USAF continues to fly these missions every single day because the pilot adds value to the mission. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. > Recent annual shuttle budgets were in the $3.2 billion range. > A steady shuttle-derived heavy lift (SDV) program, free of [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > of required launches - helping reduce the cost of spacecraft > and mission payloads. This assumes you launch 4 SDV's every year. If you don't, all you really save is the cost of an ET and the cost of two reloaded SRB's. All other costs remain whether you launch 4 times or zero. Miss one luanch in a year, and your per launch cost goes up significantly. Miss three launches, and your per luanch cost (for that single launch) is likely to be in the $2 billion range. Miss all four luanches, and your "per launch cost" for the year isn't even defined. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >Miss one luanch in a year, and your per launch cost goes up >significantly. Miss three launches, and your per luanch cost (for >that single launch) is likely to be in the $2 billion range. Miss all >four luanches, and your "per launch cost" for the year isn't even >defined. By the same token, launch six SDVs (say, four lunar flights, JIMO, and a Pentagon NMD payload) and the costs come down further. You need to average costs over more than a year. Brian > >Miss one luanch in a year, and your per launch cost goes up > >significantly. Miss three launches, and your per luanch cost (for [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > a Pentagon NMD payload) and the costs come down further. You need to > average costs over more than a year. Agreed. I'd also include those years between shutting down the shuttle program and the first launch of the new SDV. Enough of those years and you start negating the cost "benefit" of using SDV in the first place. The point has been made that new EELV facilities will need to be built if there isn't an SDV. While this is true, if you time it correctly, you won't build those facilities until you've firmed up when you need them. In the mean time, EELV would continue to fly with existing facilities, which would increase our experience with the vehicles and hopefully find lingering problems before NASA would need them for manned flights. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >> By the same token, launch six SDVs (say, four lunar flights, JIMO, and >> a Pentagon NMD payload) and the costs come down further. You need to [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >and you start negating the cost "benefit" of using SDV in the first >place. That assumes there is a gap. It's starting to look like NASA will need an additional year (out to 2011) to finish ISS as planned. Even if it doesn't, unmanned Shuttle operations could fill the interim period. Brian > That assumes there is a gap. It's starting to look like NASA will need > an additional year (out to 2011) to finish ISS as planned. Even if it > doesn't, unmanned Shuttle operations could fill the interim period. I thought manned flights of the CEV didn't start until 2014 with actual flights to the moon not starting until 2015 to 2020. Sure looks like a long gap to me. The period from 2010 (or 2011) until about 2015 to 2020 is 4 to 10 years. During that 4 to 10 year period, there will certainly be test missions flying in LEO (so you won't need a big stage to get to the moon and back). Furthermore, I doubt they will be as frequent as when the lunar missions actually start flying. This will add up to a period that will have significantly lower "upmass to LEO" requirements than the "operational" period that will follow. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. > >... At four launches per year, each launch, > > capable of putting roughly three EELV-Heavy equivalents [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > really save is the cost of an ET and the cost of two reloaded SRB's. > All other costs remain whether you launch 4 times or zero. Per-launch costs are widely variable when figured on a per-year average basis. A longer-term view is needed. The same is pretty much true of the EELV programs. Right now, the EELV effort is reportedly budgeted at about for around $670 million per year (total for both EELVs), this to keep the factories and launch sites open. Only three or four EELV launches will happen this year, making the average cost for each launch either $167 or $223 million. But over the longer run, $4 billion is budgeted for 29 planned launches through about 2009, making an average of $137 million for each mission. Costwise, EELV and SDV appear to work out to be roughly in the same ballpark, at least for basic launch cost. An SDV could prevail, however, when it comes to mission practicality and reduced mission integration costs. And yes, I think NASA would find missions for an average of four SDVs per year if a lunar program was pursued. After all, the agency found reasons to launch six or more shuttles in most years, even before there was a place (ISS) for shuttle to go. - Ed Kyle >...At four launches per year, each launch, >capable of putting roughly three EELV-Heavy equivalents >(75 metric tons) in LEO, would cost roughly $533 million - >probably putting it below the recently increased price point >per kg of EELV-Heavy... Note that the recent EELV price increases occurred solely and only because of lack of business. The prices will go *down*, not up, if NASA places a bulk order. SignatureMOST launched 30 June; science observations running | Henry Spencer since Oct; first surprises seen; papers pending. | henry@spsystems.net > This time around, NASA doesn't have to spend so much on > boosters. Years of shuttle investment provide an existing [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > - Ed Kyle Perhaps NASA wants to get away from the 'stigma' associated with STS? Two failures, resulting in *all* U.S. space deaths... Perhaps they want to try something new and considerably less expensive like the Delta IV. -- Alan Erskine We can get people to the Moon in five years, not the fifteen GWB proposes. Give NASA a real challenge Alanterskine1@bigpond.com > Perhaps NASA wants to get away from the 'stigma' associated with STS? Two > failures, resulting in *all* U.S. space deaths... There have been quite a few "space deaths", but it depends on how you define that phrase. I'd define it so as to include the Apollo 1 deaths. These guys didn't die in their T-38's, they were sitting in a capsule, in full pressure suits, when the fire broke out. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. > > Perhaps NASA wants to get away from the 'stigma' associated with STS? Two > > failures, resulting in *all* U.S. space deaths... [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > deaths. These guys didn't die in their T-38's, they were sitting in a > capsule, in full pressure suits, when the fire broke out. And neither Challenger or Columbia were in space at the time of failure. What Alan should have said was MISSION deaths. That would include both Challenger and Columbia while exlcuding Apollo 1. One should say that Challenger was an STS accident not a Shuttle accident... in other words, the launch vehicle failed, not the orbital vehicle. In the case of Columbia, the reverse may appear to be true at first, but considering the orbiter failed only because the launch vehicle dropped a piece of foam on it, it's hard to blame the shuttle itself. Bruce > One should say that Challenger was an STS accident > not a Shuttle accident... in other words, the launch > vehicle failed, not the orbital vehicle. True. But there was the mission where one SSME was shut down, and the crew had to inhibit the sensors on the remaining SSME's in order to get into orbit. Arguably that's a launch vehicle failure, but oddly enough in that case, the launch vehicle *is* the orbital vehicle. > In the case of > Columbia, the reverse may appear to be true at first, > but considering the orbiter failed only because the > launch vehicle dropped a piece of foam on it, it's > hard to blame the shuttle itself. It's a system integration failure. It would have been o.k. for the ET to shed foam, if it weren't for the shuttle bolted to the side. The problem was studied, but it was assumed that the RCC was "tougher" than the tiles. That's an engineering failure *and* a management failure for not properly solving this system integration issue that surfaced on STS-1. Jeff SignatureRemove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. >> One should say that Challenger was an STS accident >> not a Shuttle accident... in other words, the launch [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > get into orbit. Arguably that's a launch vehicle failure, but oddly > enough in that case, the launch vehicle *is* the orbital vehicle. Hmm. STS-9, pretty undeniably a) not a launch-vehicle failure b) close. Signature-Andrew Gray shimgray@bigfoot.com > It's a system integration failure. It would have been o.k. for the ET > to shed foam, if it weren't for the shuttle bolted to the side. The > problem was studied, but it was assumed that the RCC was "tougher" > than the tiles. That's an engineering failure *and* a management > failure for not properly solving this system integration issue that > surfaced on STS-1. Oh - AIUI, it didn't. The tile loss on STS-1 was due almost entirely, I believe, to SRB-related pressure waves. Falling debris was a problem early, though. Signature-Andrew Gray shimgray@bigfoot.com > One should say that Challenger was an STS accident > not a Shuttle accident... in other words, the launch > vehicle failed, not the orbital vehicle. I don't know why this got drilled into my head so well, but your defination means Challenger *was* a shuttle failure, as I believe NASA refers to the entire stack as the "Shuttle", and the orbiter alone is of course the "Orbiter". Which begs the question why is it called the "Shuttle" Landing Facility and not the "Orbiter" landing facility? SignatureThis is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | Just because something It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | is possible, doesn't No person, none, care | and it will reach me | mean it can happen > > One should say that Challenger was an STS accident > > not a Shuttle accident... in other words, the launch [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > Which begs the question why is it called the "Shuttle" Landing Facility and > not the "Orbiter" landing facility? I thought NASA refered to the entire thing as "STS" and the orbiter itself is referred to as the shuttle, the orbiter, etc. This seems obvious when one considers that Atlantis, Endeavour, Discovery are called Shuttles, and they don't change names every time they get new SRBs and an external tank. But, this could be just a primitive form of the old Metaphysics question of replacing every board and nail in a ship. (Or the old joke: "I've had this same axe for 40 years! Replaced the handle three times and the head twice!") Bruce > > There's no mention of funds for booster development--either man-rating > > a current booster, or developing a new booster in case the CEV and lunar > > vehicles can't fit current boosters. > This time around, NASA doesn't have to spend so much on > boosters. Years of shuttle investment provide an existing [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > EELV, thanks to the U.S. Air Force, is pretty much ready to > go for CEV/LEO missions. "A billion here and a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking about real money." That's already three billion dollars not included in the budget projection. Part of the existing infrastructure are those pushing-forty-years crawlers and Pads 39A and 39B; how much would it cost to adapt them to Shuttle-C requirements? If multiple Delta-4 Heavy launches are required for lunar missions, how many new pads and support facilities will have to be built? I seem to recall that it cost close to half a billion dollars to renovate a Delta launch pad; that's not a small investment. My objections to this report still stand. The only firm item is the name of the CEV, yet precise numbers are being offered about the costs over the next decade and a half. There seems to be no awareness of Murphy's law, and the summary I cited in an earlier post says that money will be taken from booster development. Reducing launch costs and increasing launcher reliability would seem like an obvious investment need, both for commercial launches and scientific missions. I'd love to see a return to the moon, but I want to see it done in a way that leads to sustained development. I don't see SEI, Junior, doing it. --Bill Thompson > > [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > about real money." That's already three billion dollars not > included in the budget projection. It seems clear that the budget projection is real only for the next five years or so. Everything after that is a really bad, low-ball guess. Any significant heavy-lift development funding would occur during that poorly-defined period. > Part of the existing infrastructure > are those pushing-forty-years crawlers and Pads 39A and 39B; how > much would it cost to adapt them to Shuttle-C requirements? Shuttle-C, as defined during the early 90's, was specifically designed to minimize infrastructure modifications - by plugging into the same structures in the same way that a shuttle orbiter did. (According to AW&ST 2-9-04, NASA has $6.2 billion invested in existing space shuttle launch infrastructure.) The crawlers and launch platforms need upgrades, but the pads, totally rebuilt for shuttle (Pad B was completed in 1985), are in somewhat better shape. I wonder if NASA shouldn't consider replacing the VAB with something smaller - perhaps an on-pad vehicle assembly infrastructure. > If multiple Delta-4 Heavy launches are required for lunar missions, > how many new pads and support facilities will have to be built? It would take three launches in short order to launch Boeing's projected translunar CEV in LEO, so I would expect a need for three parallel processing flows. Boeing's current HIF can only do two Delta 4-Heavies at a time. A second pad could be completed at SLC 37, but it seems likely that this would have to be augmented either by an entirely new launch complex (SLC 34? SLC 40?) or by simultaneous use of *both* EELVs to assemble a lunar mission. > My objections to this report still stand. The only firm item is > the name of the CEV, yet precise numbers are being offered about [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > but I want to see it done in a way that leads to sustained > development. I don't see SEI, Junior, doing it. After decades of wasted RLV development efforts that cost billions and produced no results, there is a clear need for sensible investment in U.S. liquid propulsion technology. The U.S. does not have, and badly needs, a home-grown high-thrust hydrocarbon engine. The U.S. is also losing its dominance in the liquid hydrogen engine field. I wonder if U.S. companies even know how to build rocket engines any more. The most important parts of both MB-60 and RL-60 are to be built outside the U.S.. Meanwhile, the new Ariane upper stage cryogenic engine will outclass these "U.S." counterparts. SSME, still the world's most efficient high-thrust engine, is to be abandoned apparently, as is SRB, still the world's highest thrust rocket motor. RS-68, a low-tech design meant to save money, seems to have ended up being a low-tech design that is still too costly to compete in the commercial launch business. - Ed Kyle > I couldn't find the AW&ST report online, but I did find this summary of > the budget: [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > > --Bill Thompson Mary, didn't you have something to say about 'man' rating an lv some time ago? -- Alan Erskine We can get people to the Moon in five years, not the fifteen GWB proposes. Give NASA a real challenge Alanterskine1@bigpond.com > > (snip) [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > a current booster, or developing a new booster in case the CEV and > lunar vehicles can't fit current boosters. There's no need to, at least not yet. The first CEV test flight is in 2008, but it won't fly manned until 2014, so the unmanned tests can be done on existing, non man-rated boosters. Serious funding for booster development will be freed up when the shuttle is retired in 2010. Since the booster will most likely not be a completely new development (either a man-rated EELV or an SDV), it should not require exorbitant amounts of time or money. Remember, at the time Shuttle-C was cancelled in 1991, it was about $3 billion and four years short of its first flight. SignatureJRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. The picture is sketchy, and a little out of focus...We've done Apollo/Soyuz, lots of Mir visits, done ISS, done Shuttle. Now another country has put forward a design for a multi-purpose, re-useable crew vehicle, the Kliper. And Arianespace already has a decent launcher capable of launching Kliper into space. If we are goinig to get to Mars it is going to require the resources of the international community, IMO, and here are two nations that are positioned to make a creditable contribution. My point is that we should be well past the time where international cooperation in space is regarded as a novelty. Finance is a problem. The Russian GNP rose 9.8% last year. Their economy is still in a shambles but at least not in a recession. The Russians and the French would ideally pick up the tab as their share for getting to go along on the ride. I think the French and the Russians should work out a deal to trade Klipers for Arianes anyway. Ariane was designed initially designed to loft the manned Hermes vehicle but the project was cancelled. Japan and India should be encouraged to get involved as well. We should use Kliper as part of a joint operation, and if Kliper is not good enough, sit down with them and design something that *is* good enough. Preferably one that does not have oxygen canisters bursting into flame while enroute to Mars. It will still cost $64 billion on our end. That is 1/4 of the NASA budget. The cost would consist of management and coordination costs, design and construction of a lander, subsidy to some of the partners, and contingency planning in case one of them backs out. The ISS started as a US operation, but the Soviets have come on board in a big way. I suppose Bush will need to sell the Mars program as a US project and then "add" more folks later. > If we are goinig to get to Mars it is going to require the > resources of the international community, No, it won't. > My point is that we should be well past the time where > international cooperation in space is regarded as a novelty. We are. It's not a novelty... it's a travesty. Competition is better. The occaisional bit of subcontracting is better. Reliance on other nations, especially those that are rife with anti-Americanism and corruption, is a seriously bad idea. > The ISS started as a US operation, but the Soviets have come on > board in a big way. Yeah. Look how well THAT worked out. SignatureScott Lowther, Engineer Remove the obvious (capitalized) anti-spam gibberish from the reply-to e-mail address "Scott Lowther" < > > The ISS started as a US operation, but the Soviets have come on > > board in a big way. > > Yeah. Look how well THAT worked out. I am looking and I see that the Russians are now doing the crew changes and the cargo delivery. > "Scott Lowther" < > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > I am looking and I see that the Russians are now doing the crew changes and > the cargo delivery. Crws that do little except maintain a hunk of junk. Had it been a *real* space station, without the State Department mucking it up with extraneous Russian crap, it'd be much better. Might actually be gettign some science data back. SignatureScott Lowther, Engineer Remove the obvious (capitalized) anti-spam gibberish from the reply-to e-mail address "Scott Lowther" Had it been a *real* > space station, without the State Department mucking it up with > extraneous Russian crap, it'd be much better. In order to be a real space station, it would require a real transfer vehicle. The STS was supposed to launch weekly at about $50 million per trip. The Russian "crap", now otherwise known as the Kliper, comes a lot closer in concept to being able to do this. But then they have no exclusive franchise. England, Germany, Japan, and even the US could come up with an improved design now that the STS has pointed the way. It is tempting to buy in to the argument that competition is the way to get to Mars, and that we would not have gotten to the Moon unless the Russans were trying to do the same thing. On the basic level of putting the project in motion, this was certainly true. But I somehow doubt that von Braun and others were thinking "we need to beat the Russians" as much as "wow, let's try to land on the Moon." I would agree that the ISS is not necessarily improved by the contributions of Russia compared to what the US could have achieved by expending the same funds on its own in-house projects. But the Russians came in late in the process. And they were operating under a Socialist economy, and worse a corrupt economy. I think it is possible that with the right kind of coordination that a Mars mission could achieve a net gain by involving the participation of extra-national entities. I also believe that the US could do it without outside participation. And I believe that there is a distinct chance that economic factors involving energy supplies, demographics, etc., may impact the financial ability of the US to achieve a Mars landing. [If we have to pay $10 a gallon for gas, and there is one retiree for each employee, it may be a challenge just to keep the lights on.] > It is tempting to buy in to the argument that competition is the way to get > to Mars, and that we would not have gotten to the Moon unless the Russans > were trying to do the same thing. On the basic level of putting the project > in motion, this was certainly true. But I somehow doubt that von Braun and > others were thinking "we need to beat the Russians" as much as "wow, let's > try to land on the Moon." I tend to think that if JFK had lived, people would have lost interest and the deadline would not have been met. > Reliance on other > nations, especially those that are rife with anti-Americanism and > corruption, is a seriously bad idea. Were it not for reliance on other nations, there would be e.g. no Apollo, no Gemini, no Mercury, and no STS. Not all of the tracking stations and emergency landing strips can be in the USA. The USA itself is about as 'rife with anti-Americanism and corruption' as any other country. >> Reliance on other >> nations, especially those that are rife with anti-Americanism and >> corruption, is a seriously bad idea. >Were it not for reliance on other nations, there would be e.g. no Apollo, no >Gemini, no Mercury, and no STS. Not all of the tracking stations and >emergency landing strips can be in the USA. Indeed; I think there would be a good book in not just the mechanics, but also politics of building all the tracking stations & abort sites.. SignatureA host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 > This week's AW&ST: > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) through 2020, plus $40 > billion in Fiscal 2011-20 to build and operate a CEV lunar lander. " In fifteen years, GWB's idea will be long forgotten; just like his daddy's is. George Bush 'Senior' said something *very* similar in 1989 at the 20th anniversary celebrations of Apollo II. "This time to stay" he said. Now, people don't even remember he said it, and it is _fifteen years ago this year_.... Shame, really. I call my idea "Five-by-Five" - Five billion dollars a year; five years for research and development; five years for prototype flying and initial landings (testing of equipment in space and on the Moon to make sure it works 'as advertised') and for uninterupted science; five years for industrial startup; five years for change-over to commercial operations (after commercial organisations are convinced of capabilities/profit margins) and then the five billion per year is used to develop Mars operations at a similar pace. 20 years, little risk of failure and major chance of success. This means that first human return to the Moon would be four to five years from green light, not ten, fifteen, seventeen or whatever. Once commercial operations begin on the Moon, there's no turning back. Five billion is roughly what the Shuttle costs to operate (no suggesting that STS/OSP be cancelled - quite the contrary as I feel it is a most important program). I hope you now know what I mean by "we". Five billion is sweet FA for the U.S. government, considering the amount it spends on the military (it's less that 1.5% of the current U.S defence budget and wouldn't make that much of a dint there, either) and other programs; hell, New Yorks MTA (public transport) has a budget of $7.5 billion a year! This money, however, would be in addition to the current NASA budget. Not a large amount and quite easy to achieve in my opinion. I've been working on an idea for about three years now and feel it's _just about_ ready for public opinion. Anyone interested can email me and I'll send them a copy; it runs to about 380ish kilobytes, including a couple of images. Both the size of the document and the fact that it contains images precludes posting it here. Emails will be sent individually to ensure privacy, but comments may be made to the group if you wish. sci.space.policy might be more appropriate however. -- Alan Erskine We can get people to the Moon in five years, not the fifteen GWB proposes. Give NASA a real challenge Alanterskine1@bigpond.com [snip] > Five billion dollars a year; five years for research and development; five > years for prototype flying and initial landings (testing of equipment in [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > Once commercial operations begin on the Moon, there's no turning back. [snip rest] I have no doubt that profit-driven enterprises will _eventually_ be the driving force behind space exploration and exploitation. But can someone shed some light on exactly *what* the end result product or service is going to be? Tourism? That alone doesn't seem like it would be able to sustain itself. Just once I'd like to see even the _outline_ of a business plan that proposes to make money off-Earth, excluding COMSATs. One that includes fixed, non-recurring costs, recurring costs, product market analysis, infrastructure costs, fuel costs, and every other thing that goes into what's considered to be a well-rounded business plan. What's the product? What's the market (non-government)? Where's the profit (government contract margins don't count)? I have no doubt that some day it will happen and the sooner the better AFAIC, but it has to be _realistic_. I don't see it happening any time soon. At some point you've got to have somebody profitably selling something, and then the market for services in support thereof will emerge. Until that happens I think those crying for privitization and commercialization are jumping the gun a bit. The discoveries needed that will drive the profit-seeking haven't been made yet, and jumping the gun is premature IMO. Compelling reasons for profit-driven companies to go into space don't exist yet. We have much to learn and that's what exploration and scientific discovery are all about, but companies don't like investing in R&D as a general rule. Taking the "we'll figure it out when we get there" has about as much a chance at success as the dot-com boom/bust did. Signaturebp Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003 (replace ".dot." in email address with ".") There is no product. There is no profit. > There is no product. There is no profit. So, in your opinion, there is no reason for going back to the Moon? The only practical reason for sending people is profit - profit cannot, with current or projected technology, be 'made' without people for maintenance and operations. Machines are too intricate to maintain adequately with other machines; if that were possible, there would be no aircraft or car mechanics. -- Alan Erskine We can get people to the Moon in five yea |
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